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FORM AND FUNCTION
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE:
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Larry W. Yackle*
The perennial controversy regarding federal habeas corpus
for state prisoners is driven by two related quarrels deep
within American constitutionalism. One debate is over the
respective responsibilities of the state and federal courts in the
effectuation of federal rights. The other is over the form and
function of federal rights themselves-whatever tribunals may
be charged with their enforcement. The Report on habeas
corpus for state prisoners, generated by the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Policy (OLP) near the end of the
Reagan presidency,1 takes strong positions with respect to
each of these controversies. 2 Initially, the Report insists that
the state courts should have primary responsibility for
enforcing the Bill of Rights in state criminal prosecutions and

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A.B., University of Kansas,
1968; J.D., University of Kansas School of Law, 1973; LL.M., Harvard University Law
School, 1974. I would like to thank Kathryn Abrams, Jack M. Beermann, Robert G.
Bone, Jane Maslow Cohen, Michael G. Collins, and Frederick M. Lawrence for
valuable comments. Chris Mensah helped with research.
1. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SERIES, REPORT No. 7, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE JUDGMENTS (1988), reprintedin 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 901
(1989) [hereinafter REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS]. In the current administration,
the OLP has been absorbed by the Office of Legislative Affairs. Inasmuch as this
essay is meant to be a reaction to a report generated by the former office, I continue,
of course, to refer to that office by name.
2. Professor Grano has explained that this Report, along with others in the series,
states only the policy preferences of the OLP and does not necessarily reflect the
official position of the Department of Justice, even during the last administration.
Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of ConstitutionalCriminal
Procedure:The Contribution of the Departmentof Justice's Office of Legal Policy, 22
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 395, 405 n.44 (1989). I am unaware of any comparable policy
statement from either the Office of Legislative Affairs or the Justice Department
under Mr. Bush. However, Mr. Paul L. Maloney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, recently referred repeatedly to the OLP Report in congressional
testimony. Although Mr. Maloney did not cite the Report for the view that federal
habeas corpus should be discarded entirely, he did rely heavily upon the Report in
support of restrictions on the habeas jurisdiction. Hearingson H.R. 4737 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearingson H.R.
4737] (statement of Paul L. Mahoney).
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that the lower federal courts should be banished from the
field.3 I have examined claims of this sort elsewhere and
argued that postconviction habeas corpus can orchestrate the
proper distribution of decision-making authority between the
state and federal courts.4
In addition, the Report contends that any political or
philosophical values served by criminal process are and should
be subordinate to what the Report itself takes to be the
criminal justice system's chief function: the investigation of
historical truth.5 The Report understands the search for
truth to be coextensive with the determination of factual guilt
or innocence and insists that the state courts render confident
judgments in this sense and need no federal oversight.6 In
the Report's telling, collateral litigation of Bill of Rights claims
in federal court departs needlessly from the historical office of
habeas corpus, floods the federal courts with frivolous claims,
and sacrifices legitimate interests in efficiency and finality to
the pursuit of insubstantial and speculative values.7 For
these additional reasons, according to the Report, the federal
courts' jurisdiction to hear postconviction claims should be
eliminated or drastically curtailed. I mean in this essay to
explain why this view, too, is unsound.
Part I critiques the Report's insistence that accurate fact
finding exhausts, or nearly exhausts, the objectives of criminal
justice, identifies the fundamental role of the Bill of Rights in
the American political order, and situates federal habeas corpus within that framework. Part II traces the Report's historical review of the federal habeas jurisdiction and critiques
the Report's too-convenient reliance on selected materials that,
on examination, fail to undermine conventional understandings of the writ's development as a postconviction remedy.
Part III responds to the Report's complaints regarding current
habeas corpus practice and refutes contentions that the habeas
jurisdiction overburdens federal dockets with stale claims.
Part IV takes up recent Supreme Court decisions in the field,
identifies the vision of criminal process they appear to
sponsor, and contests the notion that they support the OLP's
approach to habeas corpus.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 969-70.
Yackle, ExplainingHabeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1985).
See REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 915.
Id. at 955-63.
Id. at 943-51.
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THE BILL OF RIGHTS: FORM AND FUNCTION

The series of policy statements of which the OLP Report on
habeas corpus is a part declares by its very title8 that procedural safeguards in criminal cases are and should be tools for
discovering the truth about the historical events said to
comprise a criminal offense. An introductory statement by
former Attorney General Meese weds this "truth-seeking"
purpose to the ascertainment of factual guilt or innocence.
"The function of the criminal justice system," according to Mr.
Meese, "might best be summed up as the protection of the
innocent."9 Both the innocent defendant wrongly suspected

8. The collection of Reports is entitled the "Truth in Criminal Justice Series."
9. Mr. Meese's statements introducing the original reports were not reprinted by
the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform in its Special Issue at the request
of the OLP. The statement on habeas corpus reads as follows:
The function of the criminal justice system might best be summed up as the
protection of the innocent. In criminal prosecutions, an extensive system of
rights and procedures guards against the conviction of an innocent person.
Equally important, enforcement of the criminal law in all its phases-crime
prevention, police investigations, criminal prosecutions and corrections-also
aims at protection of the innocent. By detecting, convicting and punishing those
who break our laws, we protect innocent people from the depredations of
criminals.
To protect the innocent effectively, the criminal justice system must be
devoted to discovering the truth. The truth is the surest protection an innocent
defendant can have. Uncovering the truth and presenting it fully and fairly in
criminal proceedings is also of critical importance to the effort to restrain and
deter those who prey on the innocent.
Over the past thirty years, however, a variety of new rules have emerged that
impede the discovery of reliable evidence at the investigative stages of the
criminal justice process and that require the concealment of relevant facts at
trial. This trend has been a cause of grave concern to many Americans, who
perceive such rules as being at odds with the goals of the criminal justice
system. Within the legal profession and the law enforcement community debate
over these rules has been complicated by disagreements about the extent to
which constitutional principles or valid policy concerns require the subordination of the search for truth to other interests.
This report is a contribution to that debate. It was prepared by the Office of
Legal Policy, a component of the Department of Justice which acts as a
principal policy development body for the Department. At my request, the
Office of Legal Policy has undertaken a series of studies on the current status
of the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system.
This volume, "Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Judgments," is the
seventh in that series. It reviews the historical development of the federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction; examines the contemporary operation of that
jurisdiction as a means by which lower federal courts review state judgments;
and discusses the constitutional and policy considerations affecting the
continuation or restriction of this type of review. It also analyzes the prospects
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of crime and the innocent public are protected by the identification, conviction, and punishment of the guilty:
To protect the innocent effectively, the criminal justice
system must be devoted to discovering the truth. The
truth is the surest protection an innocent defendant can
have. Uncovering the truth and presenting it fully and
fairly in criminal proceedings is also of critical importance
to the effort to restrain and deter those who prey on the
innocent.' 0
Mr. Meese acknowledges that criminal procedure may also
serve values beyond accurate fact finding. Yet he declares
that procedural rules that subordinate the "search for truth"
to "other interests" are perceived by "many Americans" to be
"at odds with the goals of the criminal justice system.""
That public perception, in turn, warrants the rigorous critical
reexamination this series of reports is meant to supply. 2
The body of the OLP Report on habeas corpus repeats and
builds upon the same thesis. Quoting a 1935 Supreme Court
opinion out of context, the Report observes flatly that the
objective of criminal prosecutions is that "guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. " 13 The problem at present, and
apparently since the mid-1950s,' 4 is that we have lost sight

for reform in this area, considering both legislative and litigative options.
In light of the general importance of the issues raised in this report and its
companion volumes, it is fitting that they be available to the public. They will
generate considerable thought on topics of great national importance, and merit
the attention of anyone interested in a serious examination of these issues.
Meese, Introduction to OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 7, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE JUDGMENTS (1988).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 915 (quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). In Berger, the Court dealt with an extraordinarily
abusive prosecutor whose "pronounced and persistent" misconduct at trial might well
have led the jury to convict an innocent man. 295 U.S. at 84. The Court explained
that the prosecutor had two duties-to "use every legitimate means to bring about
a just [verdict]" and to "refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction." Id. at 88. To be sure, the Court said that the purpose of the law
was also two-fold: to convict the guilty and spare the innocent. But there was no
occasion in the narrow circumstances in Berger to elaborate fully on the objectives of
procedural safeguards. Certainly, there is no warrant whatever to read the Court to
have denied the significance of other values.
14. See REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 903, 932-37.
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of the guilt-determination function of criminal process and
saddled the criminal justice system with rules that conflict
with the pursuit of historical truth. In the main, the Report
has in mind an assortment of doctrines, discussed in other
entries in this series,15 by which the Supreme Court has
restrained overzealous police officers and prosecutors tempted
to seek and use evidence, however reliable, in circumstances
that threaten constitutional values apart from the determination of guilt or innocence."6
Moreover, by this account, we have allowed a troubling
asymmetry to develop in our mechanisms for curing error at
the trial level. On the one hand, erroneous acquittals are not
subject to judicial revision and thus go uncorrected on appeal
or collateral review. The public interest in convicting the
guilty is frustrated by a rule, supplied by the jeopardy
clause, 7 that insists upon holding mistaken acquittals inviolate-in the teeth of the assumed purpose of criminal justice
to achieve accuracy.' 8
On the other hand, disappointed
defendants are allowed to seek appellate and collateral review
and, in at least some instances, to upset even accurate
convictions on grounds unrelated to factual innocence. As
much as the OLP would like to permit prosecutors to appeal
from acquittals thought to be wrong, the Constitution will not
tolerate second-guessing the acquitting jury in a criminal
case.' 9 The only recourse, then, is to pare back the ability of

15. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SERIES, REPORT No. 1, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL

INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989);

OFFICE OF

LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT
No. 2, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE

EXCLUSIONARY RULE (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 573 (1989); OFFICE
OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES,
REPORT No. 4, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE ADMISSION OF CRIMINAL

HISTORIES AT TRIAL (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 707 (1989).
16. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing rules for the custodial interrogation of suspects); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(restricting contacts with suspects apart from defense counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to state criminal
cases).
17. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.

18. Of course, if it is posited that the only objective is accuracy and that an acquittal is erroneous, no interest on the part of an innocent accused is protected by barring
judicial review.
19. The sixth report in the OLP's series makes an unabashed attempt to interpret
the jeopardy clause to allow the prosecution to attack jury acquittals, but comes away
convinced that the original meaning of the fifth amendment was otherwise and that
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convicts to challenge judgments against them. The OLP's
primary target is federal habeas corpus. Inasmuch as convicts
may dispute their convictions on appeal or in postconviction
proceedings in state court, further adjudication in the federal
forum can only reexamine claims of innocence already rejected
by the state courts or expound upon matters unrelated to guilt
or innocence. Given the centrality of guilt-deterriiination
within the OLP's framework, federal habeas corpus is either
redundant or simply irrelevant.
We may expect oversimplification in a prefatory note signed
by a cabinet member charged to press the sitting president's
The OLP must offer something more
political agenda.
sophisticated if its Report is to contribute seriously to public
discussions of federal habeas corpus. The Report's conceptual
flaws are everywhere apparent. To begin, it will not do to
suggest that the guilt-determination function of criminal
process is captured entirely by a search for historical "truth."
The formulation of confident judgments about historical events
(what was done, by whom it was done, etc.) is, of course, a
critical feature of criminal proceedings, as it is of any exercise
of conventional judicial authority. Yet ascribing criminal
responsibility to a defendant is a much more complex enterprise. A court scarcely discovers guilt or innocence as a fact,
fully contained within an authenticated account of the episode
in question. As Peter Arenella has explained, criminal guilt
also contemplates a "mental element," which is essential to
responsibility, and recognizes the notion of justification or
excuse, which defeats liability.2 ° The factual record, however
well established, only lays the predicate for judgments
touching the defendant's culpability-her moral responsibility

no revisionist history can reconcile the Constitution to the OLP's desires. See OFFICE
OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES,
REPORT No. 6, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND
GOVERNMENT APPEALS OF ACQUITTALS (1987), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 831

(1989). Professor Grano advises critics to "take note" that at least in this instance,
the originalist commitments of Justice Department lawyers did not produce an
interpretation that comports with Mr. Meese's policy preferences. See Grano, supra
note 2, at 419-20. 1 take the point, but I tend to think that this exception proves a
contrary rule. The wonder is that the Reagan administration did not propose a
constitutional amendment to rid the country of an inconvenient protection for
individual liberty. Cf. S.J. Res. 180, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (the Bush
administration's proposed amendment to permit the punishment of flag 'desecration").
20. Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 197-98 (1983).
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for the harms the criminal law hopes to condemn. 21
Nor is the determination of factual guilt the raison d'etre of
criminal process. The American system of criminal justice has
always demanded a demonstration of legal guilt, by which is
meant the adjudication of a defendant's criminal culpability by
means of the process specified by law. 22 That process, in
turn, reflects a range of judgments regarding the appropriate
use of governmental power, the allocation of authority between
and among the agents of government, and, most importantly,
the received principles of liberty that structure the relations
between government and the individual in this society.23
Within the notion of legal guilt, the Bill of Rights cuts a
significant figure-most of its procedural safeguards ensuring
the accuracy of factual determinations, some furthering
structural values and principles of individual liberty. The
sixth amendment right to trial by jury enlists community
representatives to appraise a defendant's culpability; 24 the
fourth amendment ban on unreasonable search and seizure
protects personal privacy; 25 the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination safeguards individual integrity.2 6
To mute the significance of legal guilt and these further
functions of procedural safeguards is to risk grave misunderstanding of what is at stake in the criminal process. Not
even the OLP would contend (one would hope) that order
should be promoted "without law."2 7

21. Id. at 198.
22. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 166 (1968) (explaining

that a defendant can be said to be legally guilty "if and only if... factual determinations are made in procedurally regular fashion and by authorities acting within
competences duly allocated to them," and is not held guilty if"various rules designed
to protect [the accused] and to safeguard the integrity of the process are not given
effect").
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (explaining that the
requirement that jurors be drawn from a cross-section of the community not only
ensures impartiality but maintains public confidence in the criminal process and
fosters a " 'sharing in the administration ofjustice'" as a "'phase of civic responsibility,' " (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting))).
25. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (explaining that the
fourth amendment protects privacy on which an individual "justifiably" relies).
26. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (explaining that the
fifth amendment privilege protects against "physical or moral compulsion").
27. See Arenella, supra note 20, at 187 (insisting that it is trivial to note that the
Warren and Burger Courts were similar in the superficial sense that both recognized
functions for the criminal process "apart from promoting reliable guilt determinations"). Professor Grano is appropriately careful to acknowledge Professor Damaska's
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Let us be clear about at least one thing. The Bill of Rights
occupies a vital position in the ideological foundations of
American government. It is scarcely accidental that most
provisions found in the first eight amendments mandate
procedural safeguards for criminal cases. The criminal law is
the primary means by which government exercises coercive
power with respect to individuals, and, accordingly, it is in
criminal prosecutions that citizens require protection-if they
are to have it at all. Criminal cases in which courts hammer
out procedural rights are political events-recognizing,
defining, and perpetuating the perilous line that marks off
liberty from governmental power. It would be hyperbole to
portray the conviction or acquittal of criminal defendants as
subordinate to the elaboration of procedural rights in criminal
cases. Yet time and again, in case after case, as our courts
enforce individual rights, so do they demonstrate our commitment to limited government. American citizens and foreign
observers alike regard criminal cases as the crucible in which
our rights are tested and look to the treatment of those
charged with crime for genuine evidence of the measure of
individual freedom on these shores.28
The OLP Report fails to recognize all this and thus offers an
incomplete account of constitutional criminal procedure. The
Report then rests its negative appraisal of federal habeas
corpus on a flawed foundation-rejecting habeas corpus as a
significant, or even a legitimate, vehicle for confirming
individual freedom.2 9 In a real sense, however, the federal
courts' habeas authority to vindicate federal rights plays just
this critical role in the American political order.3 °

point that any system of criminal justice must strike a balance between the search
for truth and the service of other values. Grano, supra note 2, at 403 (citing
Damaska, Evidentiary Barriersto Convictionand Two Models of CriminalProcedure:
A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 576 (1973)).
28. Cf. Allen, CentralProblems ofAmerican CriminalJustice, 75 MICH. L. REV. 813,
814-15 (1977) (brilliantly articulating the threat that criminal law enforcement poses
to individual liberty).
29. See REPORT NO. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 903.
30. Whether the judicial elaboration of liberty values is wholly successful as a
means by which we pursue societal goals is debatable. Professor Seidman faults the
Warren Court for unrealistic ambitions in this respect. See Seidman, FactualGuilt
and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal
Procedure,80 COLUM. L. REV. 436 (1980). I admit to higher hopes, but the critical
point is the general agreement among observers that the courts do contribute mightily to the establishment and maintenance of liberty-however short their efforts may
fall.
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II. HABEAS HISTORY

In a section devoted to the history of habeas corpus in the
federal courts, the OLP Report resists both the notion that
postconviction habeas corpus for state prisoners is constitutionally grounded and the view that Congress meant to create
such a jurisdiction by statute. 3' According to the Report, the
habeas jurisdiction we know today is wholly the creature of
judicial decisions regarding both the scope of the writ and the
content of the federal constitutional rights the writ may be
engaged to vindicate. 32 These arguments are unexceptional,
although they are hardly so commanding as the OLP apparently believes them to be. The practical trouble with them is
that they are so obviously beside the point-a matter to which
I will return in a moment.
The Report's attack on the idea that postconviction habeas
corpus has constitutional foundation in the suspension
clause 33 tramps familiar ground. The Report argues that the
34
writ that is constitutionally protected from suspension
differs from the modern federal writ in that it addresses
custody in the hands of federal, not state, officials and that it
speaks to executive detention prior to or without trial-not to
custody under the authority of a judicial judgment. 35 Curiously, the Report passes quickly over a conventional (and
equally availing) interpretation
of the
suspension
clause-namely that the clause was meant to prevent the new
national legislature from following the practice of Parliament,
which had routinely suspended the writ in England in order
to banish disfavored dissenters to the tower without judicial
remedy.3 6 Nor does the Report make much of the familiar

31. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 916-24.
32. Id. at 932-37.
33. Id. at 918 n.8.
34. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
35. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 916.
36. See R. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE CONNECTED WITH IT: WITH A VIEW OF THE
LAW OF EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVES 122-27 (1858); W. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 40-42 (2d ed. 1893); Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the
States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 248 (1965). The Report notes that the
suspension clause appears in the Constitution among limitations on congressional
power and seems vaguely to recognize the argument in the text. Yet the analogy to
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argument that the suspension clause contemplates only a
writ issued by the state courts and does not itself establish
a habeas jurisdiction for the lower federal courts. 37 At the
least, the Report does not press these arguments clearly and
convincingly.
More disturbing than the Report's failure to advance its own
cause as well as it might is its failure to acknowledge arguments on the other side. There is a plausible case to be made
for a constitutional writ. The suspension clause conceivably
directs "all superior courts of record, state as well as federal,
to make the habeas privilege routinely available." 3' And the
Court has more than once suggested that the suspension
clause guarantees access to federal habeas, even in its modern
form.3 s There is counterevidence in the books, of course.40
But if the OLP genuinely wishes to contribute to discussion of
the constitutional question, its Report must take issue with
interpretations of the suspension clause that would make that

Parliament's actions is never explicitly drawn, and the Report's discussion slides
quickly to the point that, in 1789, only prisoners in federal custody enjoyed access to
the writ. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 919.
37. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1513-14 (2d ed. 1973) cited in
REPORT NO. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 918 n.8 (adopting the conventional
view that the Constitution does not require Congress to establish lower federal courts
and recalling that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to grant the writ of
habeas corpus to state prisoners until 1867).
38. Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 607.
39. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963) (warning that alterations
in modern habeas practice that "derogate from the traditional liberality of the writ
... might raise serious constitutional questions" under the suspension clause); Jones
v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963) (stating that "[the [federal] habeas corpus
statute implements the constitutional command that the writ of habeas corpus be
made available"); cf. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1976)
(mentioning but avoiding a suspension clause claim); Scaggs v. Larsen, 396 U.S. 1206
(1969) (Douglas, J.) (relying in part on the suspension clause to order the release of
a military reservist); Locks v. Commanding General, 89 S. Ct. 31, 32 (Douglas,
Circuit Justice 1968) (noting that the suspension clause may empower individual
Justices of the Supreme Court to issue the writ but that the question "has never been
decided"); cf. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (discussing whether
federal habeas corpus statutes properly implement the suspension clause); Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 798 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that habeas
corpus is "written into the Constitution" and that its availability "cannot ... be
constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Congress").
40. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 445 n.7 (1986) (noting that the
modern postconviction writ and the writ with which the suspension clause is
concerned may not be the same); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372,384 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) (contending that the suspension clause constitutionalizes the writ
only as it existed when the Constitution was adopted); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 835 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (same); id. at 840 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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clause an important factor in contemporary thinking about
habeas corpus. 4 '
The same must be said with respect to the Report's treatment of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 ("the 1867 Act").4 2
Briefly stated, the Report argues that the 1867 Act's sole
purpose was to provide a federal judicial remedy for emancipated Blacks in the South, who were still being held in overt
slavery or under oppressive apprenticeships and servitudes
substituted for slavery in the wake of the thirteenth amendment.43 It was people of that kind, "restrained of [their]
liberty" in continued slavery or peonage, who required federal
judicial orders for their release. 4 The only citation for this
proposition is an article by Lewis Mayers, whose work on the
legislative records of the period persuaded him that Congress
meant the 1867 Act as an enforcement device for the thirteenth amendment rather than as an authority in the federal
courts to entertain petitions from prisoners in jail-either
before or after conviction in state court.4 5 Mayers' paper was
published in 1965 as a response to the decision in Fay v.
Noia,46 in which the Supreme Court interpreted the 1867 Act
to establish a statutory grant of jurisdiction to determine
federal claims by prisoners in state custody.4 7 Inasmuch as
Noia is a prime target for the OLP's complaints regarding
federal habeas corpus, 4 it is not surprising that Mayers'
contemporaneous criticism of that decision should find its way

41. Certainly, it is inadequate to charge critics with "equivocation"-defined by the
Report as "drawing specious inferences by using a term with a particular meaning
at one point in an argument and using the same term with another meaning at a
different point in the argument." REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at
955 n.133. In this context, critics of the OLP's position are said to contend that
modern postconviction habeas (meaning #1) cannot be restricted because the writ
protected by the suspension clause (meaning #2) cannot be withdrawn. Yet it is
scarcely settled that the familiar brand of postconviction habeas corpus today is
qualitatively different from the writ safeguarded by the Constitution from suspension. That is the matter in issue.
42. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
43. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 921-24.
44. Id. at 922; see, e.g., In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14, 247)
(involving a former slave seeking relief from "restraint and detention" under an
apprenticeship to her former master--executed by her mother only two days after the
petitioner had been emancipated).
45. See REPORT NO. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 921 n.13 (citing Mayers,

The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI.
L. REV. 31 (1965)).
46. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
47. Id. at 415; Mayers, supra note 45, at 31.
48. See REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 952.
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into the Justice Department's files and should figure prominently in the OLP Report.
Although Mayers deals Justice Brennan's opinion in Noia
some solid blows, his divergent account of the 1867 Act is
hardly telling. His paper suffers from the same liabilities that
beset any intentionalist inquiry. At the most fundamental
level, Mayers assumes that the meaning to be assigned to the
1867 Act is controlled by the intentions of those responsible for
it. 49 In the poststructuralist world, this unexamined acknowledgement of authorial sovereignty over written text is
disquieting, to say the least. Going on, and even laying aside
the insights of modern literary theory, it is startling that
Mayers seems not to recognize the significance of choosing the
actors whose intentions should count in the interpretive
exercise. He selects as his target the drafter of the bill in the
House, presumed but not known to have been Representative
William Lawrence of Ohio.5 ° Digging ever deeper into the
mire, Mayers seeks not the drafter's general purpose for the
bill, but his subjective attitude-what was "present in his
mind" at the time. 5 Mayers can't know that. Even if he
could and did, he would have nothing. For if any historical
intention is probative, it surely must be the collective intention of the majorities in the House and the Senate, whose
votes made the 1867 Act the law of the land. It is foolish to
think that there was any such group intention (for this or any
other measure passed by Congress) and equally foolish to
think that an historian could lay hands on it if it existed.
Mayers contends that the bill originated in the House in
response to an earlier resolution calling for legislation to
effectuate the thirteenth amendment.5 2 Yet he concedes that

49. Mayers, supra note 45, at 36.
50. See Mayers, supra note 45, at 35-36; see also REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS,
supra note 1, at 922. Often, Professor Mayers refers to "intent" without specifying
the person or persons of whom he is speaking. But I count at least six explicit
statements in the paper indicating that Mayers' focus is on the drafter of the bill. On
one occasion, he refers as well to what the "proponents" of the bill "had in mind,"
Mayers, supra note 45, at 54, but it is unclear whether he means the small group of
individual members who were apparently pushing the measure along or the
majorities that voted for it in the end. Once, Mayers mentions "congressional intent."
Id. at 42.
51. See Mayers, supra note 45, at 38.
52. Mayers cites a House resolution, dated December 19, 1865, which directed the
Committee on the Judiciary to propose legislation "to enforce the liberty of all persons
under the operation of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery." Mayers,
supra note 45, at 34 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1865)). He
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when the bill was offered, first in the House and then in the
Senate, the managers described it quite differently. Representative Lawrence referred to the prior resolution, but he went
on to say that the bill would enable the federal courts to "enforce the liberty of all persons" and that it would extend to the
federal courts a habeas corpus jurisdiction "coextensive with
all the powers that can be conferred upon them."5 3 Lawrence
also characterized the bill as "of the largest liberty," a label
fairly suggesting an expansive jurisdiction.5 4
notes that a bill prescribing habeas corpus relief for persons " 'held in slavery or
involuntary servitude otherwise than for crime whereof they are convicted' " was
introduced in the committee a few weeks later. Id. (quoting a handwritten document
in the National Archives) (emphasis added by this author). That bill failed to clear
committee, but later a "new measure" was prepared and reported out in conjunction
with what Mayers thinks was an "unrelated measure" regarding the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to review state court judgments on writ of error-the enactment that
spawned the controversy in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590
(1875). According to Mayers, this second habeas corpus bill (lightly amended) became
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. Mayers, supra note 45, at 34-35. Because
Representative Lawrence mentioned the December 19 resolution in his presentation
of the bill to the House, Mayers infers that Lawrence intended it to reach only
persons suffering some form of servitude left over from chattel slavery. Id. at 36-37
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866)).
53. Mayers, supra note 45, at 36-37 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
4151 (1866)). Mayers insists that when Lawrence referred to the liberty of "all
persons" rather than "persons under the operation of the constitutional amendment
abolishing slavery," which had been the language of the December 19 resolution, see
supra note 52, he merely neglected an intended qualification in the "stress of debate."
Mayers, supra note 45, at 36 n.28. Mayers notes that Lawrence later told the House
that a district judge in Kentucky had held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction
to enforce the rights of "such" persons, and takes that as an indication that Lawrence
had a particular category of "persons" in mind-recently freed slaves. Id. at 36-37.
The point is fair. A speaker who means genuinely to refer to "all" people may be
unlikely in the next breath seemingly to reduce the field to "such" persons. Yet in
the "stress of debate" a speaker may get a lot of things muddled, and it is anything
but clear that Lawrence misspoke when he referred to "all persons" rather than when
he injected "such" persons into his speech. Mayers' interpretation may be accurate,
but it is also convenient for his argument. The speech was ambiguous. What counts,
or would seem to count, is the interpretation that the majority that voted for the bill
placed upon it-if, indeed, even that is probative of the meaning to be given a
Reconstruction era statute today.
54. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 4151 (1866). Justice Brennan quotes the
"largest liberty" line in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417 (1963). Mayers objects that
the quotation is out of context. The rest of the sentence concerns persons in military
custody, and Mayers insists that severing the tie to military prisoners obscures the
speaker's meaning. Mayers, supra note 45, at 38. Section 2 of the bill specifically
exempted military prisoners from its scope, Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14
Stat. 385., for the reason (according to Mayers) that some military prisoners in 1866
were not entitled to habeas corpus pursuant to the Judiciary Act of 1789 because of
the wartime suspension of the writ, and because the drafter had no intention of
revoking that suspension by the enactment of this bill. Mayers, supra note 45, at 38.
When, however, the suspension was lifted in due course, military prisoners would
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In the Senate, Senator Lyman Trumbull described the bill
precisely in the manner in which it has been interpreted by
the modern Court: as the relaxation of the chief limitation on
federal habeas corpus fixed by the Judiciary Act of 1789-the
restriction of the writ to prisoners held in federal custody.55
Upon enactment, Trumbull told the Senate, the measure
would empower the federal courts to entertain petitions from
prisoners in state custody as well, provided they complained
of detention in violation of federal law.56 Both houses ultimately adopted the bill without illuminating debate. In these
circumstances, one might conclude that if any intention is to
be identified and given significance in the interpretation of the
1867 Act, it is the intention the majorities in the two bodies
might reasonably have taken from the face of the bill and from
the representations made by Lawrence and Trumbull: that the
bill would establish a federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for

again have access to the writ-by dint of the 1789 Act. Id. In his speech on the floor,
then, Lawrence meant to assure the House that the exemption for military prisoners
in the bill under discussion would not restrict the availability of the writ to military
prisoners once the suspension now affecting them was ended. Id. Once again,
Mayers' explanation for Lawrence's language is plausible, but one has to ask whether
it overwhelms alternative accounts.
55. Mayers, supra note 45, at 38-39 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
4229 (1866)); see also REPORT NO. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 922-24;
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
56. Mayers, supra note 45, at 38-39 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
4229 (1866)). Mayers protests that Trumbull was simply "ignoran[t] of the purpose
of the House bill." Id. at 39. Trumbull knew nothing about the bill prior to
presenting it on the floor and, in fact, only advanced the bill as a favor to an
unnamed member of the House who had asked him to handle the matter, and who
apparently had assured him it was noncontroversial. In Mayers' telling, Trumbull
"[p]resumably" drew the objective of the bill from its language and offered that
understanding to the Senate. Id. To Mayers, the episode demonstrates that the
intention behind the bill was not what Trumbull told the Senate it was. Yet it seems
the better inference is just the opposite. However confused Trumbull may have been
regarding the understanding of the bill by its drafter or, for that matter, by the
House of Representatives, his explanation to the Senate is far more important. If
this is the way he himself understood the bill (from its language, not its history), and
the way he presented the bill, and if the bill was enacted with little or no further
discussion (another point Mayers thinks supports his point of view), then one may
fairly infer that at least some members voting "aye" may have meant to embrace
Trumbull's account. And isn't the intention of the majority of the Senate-the body
that (with the House) made the bill law-the critical matter (within the intentionalist
framework)? In this vein, I am not sure I see the point of Mayers' note that Senator
Trumbull latervoiced an explanation for the habeas corpus bill more in keeping with
the intention Mayers ascribes to the drafter in the House. Id. at 39 & n.39 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2096 (1868)). Of far greater value are Mayers'
notes that two senators made brief remarks indicating that they might well have
thought the bill applied to prisoners in general. Id. at 40 & n.40.
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state prisoners complaining of custody in violation of federal
law.
Mayers fares better when he shifts away from the supposed
subjective intentions of the drafter and probes contextual
implications. He contends, for example, that the "negligent
draftsmanship" of the bill, the "indifference" shown to it by the
Senate, and the absence of serious debate before passage
suggest that Congress did not understand that it was creating
a new and sweeping federal jurisdiction to inquire into the
validity of state prisoners' detention.5" The bar demonstrated
no such understanding at the time;5 9 no one appears expressly to have associated the 1867 Act with contemporaneous
Reconstruction legislation or, indeed, with the fourteenth
amendment itself;6 ° and most importantly, a plenary jurisdiction to adjudicate federal claims by state prisoners would have
been largely fruitless in a time when the content of due
process was minimal and incorporation theory was questionable.6 ' Inferences from silence offer a plausible, and more
objective, basis for the proposition that the 1867 Act was
generally thought, at the time of enactment, to be a narrowly
focused measure in aid of emancipation.
Still, even persuasive evidence of historical intent is helpful
in resolving legal issues only if one initially accepts the notion
that positive law can and should be interpreted according to
what can be gleaned from incomplete historical documents
that themselves must be interpreted. The search for legislative purpose is vexing enough with respect to recently enacted
statutes. Mayers' exercise demonstrates the practical impossibility of intentionalism as an interpretive strategy for materials from the Reconstruction period. Historical inquiries of this
kind are creative, not descriptive. Meaning cannot be drawn
from the 1867 Act; rather, meaning must be assigned to that
Act-meaning forged not only from the language of the statute
and its murky historical record, but from reasoned judgment
about concrete legal problems that face the nation today.
Even if we could do the impossible and identify with confidence what the Congress intended for habeas corpus jurisdic-

57. Mayers contends that the bill's failure expressly to refer to "prisoners" refutes
this conclusion. Mayers, supra note 45, at 40-41 & n.41.
58. Id. at 40-41 & n.40.
59. Id. at 42-43.
60. Id. at 48-53.
61. Id. at 54-55.

700

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 23:4

tion in 1867, we would scarcely let that discovery dominate
current decisions about the appropriate sphere of the federal
courts.
Of course, we don't, and we haven't. The OLP Report
grudgingly recounts a long line of Supreme Court precedents,
culminating in the acknowledgement of postconviction habeas
corpus as a routine mechanism, for the federal adjudication of
federal claims.6 2 Notwithstanding the bits and pieces of historical evidence on which Mayers relies, as early as 1886 the
Court held that the federal courts in 1867 were granted
jurisdiction in "language as broad as could well be employed."6 3 On a case-by-case basis over the years since, the
Court has groomed the writ for its modern role.' Today, and
for good reason, the 1867 Act is understood as an amendment
to the habeas corpus provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789
("the 1789 Act")-extending the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction to prisoners in state custody, either before or after conviction.65
The OLP Report laments all this, pausing in particular to
fault the decision in Brown v. Allen, 66 which confirmed state
prisoners' access to the federal courts to attack state criminal
judgments collaterally. Importantly, Brown was decided in
1953, and the scoundrel of the piece (by the OLP's own
account) was not Earl Warren or even Justice Brennan, but
Felix Frankfurter. For my part, Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Brown was his grandest hour. In any case, the
fundamental proposition in Brown is now well settled.6 7

62. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 924-37.
63. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 247 (1886).
64. The Report's principal source is Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963), which offers a
reading of the cases repudiated by the Court's decision in Fay v. Noia, handed down
in the same year. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 924 n.25. The
Report does not refer to well-known academic criticisms of Bator's work. E.g., Peller,
In Defense of FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579
(1982). Again, good scholarship demands attention to competing points of view. E.g.,
Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 264-73 (1988) (offering a
revisionist appraisal of Brown v. Allen 344 U.S. 443 (1953), but not before addressing
other positions recorded in the literature).
65. See, e.g., Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv., 458 U.S. 502, 509 n.9
(1982) (stating that "U]urisdiction to challenge both state and federal judgments is
conferred by § 2241"-the basic jurisdictional statute derived from the 1789 Act).
66. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
67. For all the rhetoric in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court insisted
in that case that its decision largely to abandon the enforcement of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in habeas corpus was not to be taken as a limitation on the
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Even if the force of consistent precedent is insufficient, there
is the undeniable point that the legislative branch has (at
least) acquiesced in a general postconviction habeas jurisdiction. Not only has Congress repeatedly rejected proposals to
overrule Brown,68 it has also adopted legislation that plainly
accepts the very role for postconviction habeas contemplated
in the cases. Mayers himself recognizes that the 1948 revision
of the Judicial Code,69 which included what is now 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, seems clearly to have ratified the Court's understand-

federal courts' jurisdiction to determine exclusionary rule claims. Id. at 494-95 &
n.37. In most cases, the practical result of Stone may approach the result that would
follow from restricting jurisdiction. See O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 121112 (5th Cir. 1977). Yet the availability of habeas review within the narrow exception
allowed by the Stone opinion cannot be overlooked. See, e.g., Bailey v. Duckworth,
699 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that an exclusionary rule claim could be
heard in federal court because the state courts had not accorded the petitioner an
opportunity for full and fair adjudication of that claim); Halpern, Federal Habeas
Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1982) (discussing the exception allowed by Stone). Even the current Court's
extraordinarily rigid rules for cutting off claims for procedural default in state court
begin with the assumption that Brown is good law. E.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (stating that the "rule of Brown v. Allen is in no way changed by
our holding today"); see also, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986)
(reaffirming that the "federal courts at all times retain the power to look beyond state
procedural forfeitures").
I wrote the first draft of this commentary just after Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), in which, speaking for a plurality, Justice O'Connor warned federal habeas
corpus petitioners that they would henceforth be entitled to press for or rely upon a
'new rule" of constitutional law only in narrow circumstances. Id. at 310. While I
was preparing a second draft, Justice O'Connor invoked the Teague approach to the
'retroactivity" problem in Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989)-this time for a
majority and in a capital case. While the editors were examining my second draft,
the Court handed down two more decisions elaborating on Teague: Butler v.
McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990), and Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990). Read
literally, Butler defines a "new rule" as a legal proposition, the correctness of which
was open to argument among reasonable minds at the time the habeas petitioner's
sentence became final. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1216. This is not the place to explicate
Teague and its progeny or, certainly, to explore the implications of the notion that
constitutional law can sensibly be understood as a series of lurching leaps from
unquestionable propositions to "new rules." This essay is meant to be a retrospective
examination of what I consider to be the OLP's misguided ideas about federal habeas
corpus. I should not wish now to transform it into a speculative look into the future.
I leave for another day an attempt to situate Teague in an intelligible account of the
federal habeas jurisdiction. Let me only say that any move to unseat Brown, in
effect, by means of a new approach to "retroactivity" would be bizarre.
68. The Report recalls these failed attempts in order. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS
CORPUS, supra note 1, at 942-45 (citing, e.g., H.R. 5649, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955);
S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)).
69. Act of June 25, 1948, Ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967 (codified as amended as United
States Code, Title 28).
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ing of the 1867 Act. 7' That legislation was before the Court
in Brown, of course, and even more recent enactments,
particularly the establishment of the federal rules for habeas
practice in 1977,71 close the books on the question whether
current law makes the federal forum available to state
prisoners.
At the end of the day, the OLP gets nowhere in its attempt
to portray modern habeas corpus as a colossal mistake, the
product of bad history and worse, judicial manipulation. The
framework now in place is the framework we have knowingly
established for ourselves through both legislative and judicial
means. If the OLP hopes to move American society in a new
direction, this Report on habeas corpus must press on to
straightforward arguments from policy. The Report does shift
to policy analysis, but stumbles clumsily in that unfamiliar
territory.7 2

70. Mayers, supra note 45, at 32 & n.7.
71. Rules on Habeas Corpus, Pub. L. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334 (1976) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rules 1-11 (1988)).
72. As I reflect on the Justice Department's enthusiastic embrace of Mayers' account
of the 1867 Act and Professor Bator's critique of relevant Supreme Court precedents,
I am torn between two ostensible explanations. The one is obvious enough. Despite
the introduction by Mr. Meese, perhaps the Report is not meant to be a contribution
to serious debate, but a brief in support of a chosen result-the abolition of
postconviction habeas corpus in the federal courts. That would account not only for
the selection of authorities on which the Report relies, but for the bad scholarship the
Report exhibits. Contra Mr. Meese, Professor Grano understands that this and other
Reports were prepared primarily to guide the Attorney General and not to enlighten
the public. Grano thus acknowledges the brief-like advocacy in some Reports,
although he insists that "the Reports generally present a careful and complete legal
analysis...." Grano, supra note 2, at 411 n.76. As my text makes clear, I think the
habeas corpus Report misses that mark. Indeed, it is sloppy work like this, embraced
too quickly by respected academics like Grano, that gives "conservative" treatments
of constitutional law a bad name. Cf. id. at 398 n.12 (complaining that many
academics in the field employ "inflated rhetoric" in criticizing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinions).
The other explanation is even less charitable. The Report's infatuation with
Mayers' historical study may reflect a belief, not to say a faith, that law (or at least
the best kind of law) is the product of some event or events long ago and now must
simply be discovered as a matter of fact and accepted without further argument.
Overstated, the notion is that law is or ought to be comparatively objective, not
subject to current seasoning to taste. This is the spirit of originalism in constitutional analysis, with which the Office of Legal Policy under Mr. Meese was
apparently much taken. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1988). A similar yearning for objectivity
may color the Report's insistence that criminal justice is primarily concerned with the
discovery of historical "truth." Suffice it to say that the pursuit of objectivity in this
sense is a fool's errand. The responsibility for law of any kind is ours, ours in the
here and now. We make and remake our law on a daily basis and cannot ascribe
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III. THE PRACTICAL SIDE OF FEDERAL HABEAS

The OLP Report treats several practical problems said to
attend habeas corpus litigation within the current scheme.7 3
I will focus on three administrative charges the Report puts
forward. The Report states, first, that habeas corpus petitions
from state prisoners overload federal dockets;74 second, that
prisoners fail to pursue federal relief as soon as they are
able; 75 and, third, that claims in federal habeas proceedings
are so rarely meritorious that the maintenance of the federal
courts' jurisdiction to entertain petitions from state prisoners
fails a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis. 7' None of these
charges is sustained by the evidence.
The first argument, that the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction opens the floodgates to waves of petitions that engulf the
federal courts, is flawed in several respects. To begin, the
statement of the argument reflects an anterior judgment about
the relative value of habeas litigation. We may take as given
that some body of cases will consume the federal courts' scarce
resources. Any concern that a particular category of cases is
heavily represented must depend upon a judgment that cases

responsibility to wiser heads who thought great thoughts a century or more ago. This
is not to say that law cannot be objective in any sense, but only to insist that
objectivity must flow from reasoned, current analysis of concrete problems and the
values and policies at stake in those problems.
73. The Report also takes up a range of policy considerations. Needless to say,
I am satisfied, contra the Report, that the values protected by federal habeas
corpus more than justify its existence. Taking the considerations identified by the
Report in turn, I am persuaded, as the OLP is not, that we should approach the
modern postconviction writ with the reverence associated with habeas at common
law; that the accumulated import of habeas law to date does indicate that litigants
with federal claims are entitled to at least one fair opportunity to litigate those
claims in a federal forum; that the federal courts often do provide a more
sympathetic forum for federal claims; that the federal district and circuit courts do
and should serve as surrogates for the Supreme Court; that federal articulation of
federal rights is of great value; that federal habeas corpus is needed to correct
injustices visited upon prisoners in state court; that prisoners do profit psychologically from the availability of the federal courts for the treatment of their claims;
that the institutional position of the federal courts does permit them to adjudicate
federal claims independently; and that federal habeas corpus does generate a
valuable dialogue between the federal and state courts. See L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES, 71-150 (1981) (collecting illustrations). Contra REPORT No. 7,
HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 953-66.
74. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 945-49.
75. Id. at 949-51.
76. Id. at 948-49.
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of that kind are less entitled to the time and effort they
demand than are other cases competing for space on the
docket. The floodgates argument is therefore circular and
cannot answer the question before the house: whether habeas
corpus petitions should command significant judicial attention. 7
Moreover, the floodgates argument is wrong on the facts.
Years ago, when the federal habeas jurisdiction flowered in
the wake of Brown v. Allen,"S there was perhaps some currency to Justice Jackson's fear that habeas petitioners would
"inundate" the lower federal courts and "swell" the Supreme
Court's own case load. 79 Even at that time, however, the
portion of federal civil dockets given over to habeas actions by
state prisoners was very small; Judith Resnik recalls that all
prisoner filings averaged 2% of the federal docket over the fifteen-year period, 1944-59." 0 To be sure, there was reason to
think that the habeas filing rate might increase and, in fact,
it did increase for a time. The OLP Report notes the raw
numbers of cases from the late 1970s (when the Warren
Court's decisions still set the tone) down to the mid-to-late
1980s (by which time the current Court's decisions were
presumably having some effect). Habeas filings rose from
7,033 in 1978 to 9,542 in 1987-an increase of 2,509, or 36%,
over the decade."' Yet the raw numbers tell very little of the
story. In the same period, 1978-87, the number of potential
habeas petitioners increased from a minimum of 267,1552 to
517,733 3-an increase of 250,578, or 94%. Thus the rate of

77. Cf. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 951-56 (1984) (treating as normative
the question whether habeas petitions should consume scarce feddral resources).
78. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
79. The OLP recalls Jackson's notation that 541 petitions had been filed in the year
preceding Brown. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 945 (citing Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 536 n.8 (Jackson, J., concurring in result)).
80. Resnik, supra note 77, at 940 (relying on data in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, in
REPORTS OF THE PRECEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
(1945-60)).
81. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 947.
82. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN STATE AND

FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS ON DECEMBER 31, 1978, at 12, Table 1 (1980). This figure and
the next figure for the state prisoner population in 1987 include all prisoners
sentenced to more than one year of incarceration under the jurisdiction of state
correctional authorities.
83. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL DATA BOOK AND
GUIDE TO SOURCES, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 183 (table 318)

(109th ed. 1989).
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habeas corpus filings (the percentage of potential applicants
who actually sought habeas relief) dramatically declined
during the period in question-from 2.54% in 1978 to 1.84% in
1987.4 The OLP Report leaves the impression of a current
glut of habeas petitions that worsens by the year. That
impression is misleading at best.
The contention that state prisoners frequently delay their
applications for federal habeas corpus relief is equally unsound. Initially, the notion that prisoners sit on their rights
is counterintuitive. Citizens suffering what they consider to
be invalid incarceration can be expected to put their claims to
the federal courts as quickly as they reasonably can. The
sooner they litigate, the sooner they may win relief. The
record now thought to be favorable may become cold. Documents may be lost; witnesses may become unavailable.
Moreover, prisoners who believe themselves wronged have a
psychological incentive to press their grievances promptly.
The OLP Report insists, by contrast, that prisoners may
deliberately postpone litigation until the record has grown
stale and the state is prejudiced either in responding to
constitutional claims or in reprosecuting after the federal
courts grant relief.85 This is an old tactic in the war on
habeas corpus: depict petitioners as sophisticated strategists
who abuse the judicial system's tolerance for illegitimate ends.
The picture is wholly fictitious. Prison inmates are not the
manipulators the OLP makes them out to be; typically they
are undereducated young men8 1 from the streets with neither
the will nor the means to outwit the prosecutors and judges
before whom they appear. If prisoners seem to delay beyond
the earliest moment when they might file, it is undoubtedly
because they lack professional counsel and thus are unable to
identify claims, prepare them for litigation, and approach the
courts as soon as would potential litigants not in custody.

84. These figures greatly underestimate the number of potential habeas corpus
applicants. For not only prison inmates, but jail prisoners, as well as parolees and
probationers, are eligible to seek federal habeas review. If I were to collect data
regarding changes in the populations in these further categories, I dare say each
would show significant increases-demonstrating the point in the text all the more
forcefully. Moreover, both the number of federal district judges and the size of their
nonhabeas dockets increased dramatically over the same period, such that more
judges are now available to hear habeas corpus petitions. See Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 7 (table 3) (1987).
85. See REPORT NO. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 951.
86. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 83, at 183 (table 319).

706

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 23:4

The OLP Report singles out death penalty cases for special
attention in connection with delays in habeas corpus practice,8 7 and in this the Report finds itself in prestigious company. At an American Bar Association meeting last year,
Chief Justice Rehnquist said that the usual incentives for
prompt litigation do not operate in capital cases: A prisoner
on death row "does not need to prevail on the merits in order
to accomplish his purpose; he wins temporary victories by
postponing a final adjudication.""
This account of the
incentive structure in capital cases evidently prompted the
Chief Justice to appoint an ad hoc committee on habeas corpus
in capital cases, chaired by former Justice Powell, whose recommendations have caused such a flurry in the Congress.8 9

87. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 950-51.
88. W. Rehnquist, Remarks at the American Bar Association Mid-Year Meeting
(Feb. 6, 1989) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform). The
Chief Justice has repeated this view more recently, distinguishing cleanly between
noncapital and capital cases:
[S]omeone who is convicted and sentenced to prison for a term of years in state
court, and wishes to challenge that conviction and sentence in a federal habeas
proceeding, has every incentive to move promptly to make that challenge....
This is true even though there is no statute of limitations for bringing the
federal habeas proceeding.
But the incentives are quite the other way with a capital defendant. All
federal review of his sentence must obviously take place before the sentence is
carried out; consequently, the capital defendant frequently finds it in his
interest to do nothing until a death warrant is actually issued by the state.
W. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the American Law Institute Annual
Meeting 4-5 (May 15, 1990) (on file with the University of Michigan Journalof Law
Reform); accord Hearings on H.R. 4737, supra note 2 (statement of former Justice
Lewis F. Powell Jr.).
89. AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, COMMITTEE
REPORT (1989), reprinted in 135 Cong. Rec. S13,481 (daily ed. Oct., 16, 1989). The
Chief Justice appointed the committee in June, 1988. Thereafter, the 100th Congress
wrote a reference to the committee into the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, enacted late
in the 1988 session. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4467. The Act instructed
the chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Biden, to introduce
a habeas corpus reform bill within 15 legislative days following receipt of the
committee report from the Chief Justice. Id. The committee worked on its project
for just over a year, then submitted a report to the Judicial Conference of the United
States in September 1989. The Conference tabled the matter until its next meeting.
See Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 22, 1989), reprintedin 135 CONG. REC.
S13,481 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1989). The Chief Justice nevertheless sent the preliminary
report to Senator Biden immediately, explaining that he interpreted the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act to contemplate submission of the report-with or without action by the
Judicial Conference. W. Rehnquist, Statement of the Chief Justice (Oct. 5, 1989) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform). Fourteen members of
the Conference joined in a letter to L. Ralph Mecham, Secretary to the Judicial
Conference, asking Mr. Mecham to approach the chairs of the judiciary committees
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The same sentiment appears to be behind similar proposals for
change offered by the ABA's Criminal Justice Section.90
Accordingly, it may be appropriate to spend a moment on
death penalty cases.
The notion that capital petitioners are content to languish
on death row, to engage in dilatory tactics, and generally to
abuse avenues for frivolous litigation in order to postpone the
Death
inevitable is not supported by any reliable data.9
sentences scarcely eliminate the incentive structure facing
prisoners. Men and women under sentence of death may feel
psychological pressures to press their grievances most acutely.

in the Senate and the House to request that no action be taken on the committee
report until the judges could be heard in hearings. See Letter to the Honorable L.
Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference of the United States, regarding the
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases (Oct. 4, 1989)
(on file with the Universityof MichiganJournalof Law Reform); see also Greenhouse,
Judges ChallengeRehnquistAction on Death Penalty,N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1989, at Al,
col. 3. Senator Biden asked Chief Justice Rehnquist whether, in these circumstances,
the Chief Justice meant by early submission of the report to invoke the 15-day time
limit specified in the Act. The Chief Justice declined to change his position. See
Greenhouse, Rehnquist Renews Request to Senate, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at A21,
col. 1. Senator Biden then found himself obliged to review the committee report
quickly and to present a bill. On October 16, 1989, Senator Biden introduced a
habeas corpus reform bill patterned after, but differing from, the Powell committee
report. S. 1757, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S13,474 (daily ed. Oct. 16,
1989). Later the same day, Senator Thurmond introduced a bill tracking the Powell
committee report precisely. S. 1760, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S13,480
(daily ed. Oct. 16, 1989). At a meeting on March 14, 1990, the Judicial Conference
approved some aspects of the Powell committee's plan, but rejected two key elements.
Where the committee would give death penalty states the option of appointing counsel for petitioners in state collateral proceedings and would leave it to the states to
establish performance standards for the lawyers appointed, the full Conference
recommends that all death penalty states should be required to provide counsel to
indigents at all stages of state court proceedings and that the attorneys so appointed
should be subject to 'one mandatory national standard." Resolution of the Judicial
Conference of the United States regarding the Powell Ad Hoc Committee on Habeas
Corpus Involving Capital Cases 1-2 (March 14, 1990) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journalof Law Reform). In addition, the Conference recommends that a
successive petition from the same prisoner should be entertained if the claim rests
on facts that, if proved, 'would undermine the court's confidence" not only in the
petitioner's factual guilt, but in the appropriateness of the death sentence. Id. at 3.
At the meeting, other proposals to mitigate the harshness of the Powell committee
plan were disapproved by narrow margins. In two instances, the Chief Justice
himself cast negative votes to produce ties and thus to defeat amendments that would
have made federal habeas more accessible to capital petitioners. See Greenhouse,
Vote is a Rebuff for ChiefJustice, N.Y. Times, March 15, 1990, at A16, col. 1.
90. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW
IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES (1990).
91. See Hearingon S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 106 (1985) (statement of Phylis Skloot Bamberger on behalf of the American
Bar Association).
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They can be expected to act immediately in order to vindicate
themselves, in their own eyes and in the eyes of family and
friends, and, of course, to relieve themselves of the prospect of
execution. It is most unlikely that capital prisoners choose to
remain on death row with the threat of death hanging over
them rather than risk litigation that may conclude their
claims unsuccessfully. The mental torment such a scenario
contemplates would be staggering.
The only significant distinction between capital habeas cases
and others is that death row petitioners are more likely to
have counsel, albeit only in the eleventh hour.9 2 The stakes
being what they are, lawyers who enter death cases are
warranted in taking the time necessary for careful legal
work.9 3 Habeas corpus litigation can be complicated in any
instance; in death penalty cases, it is extraordinarily complex
and time-consuming.9 4 Initially, a lawyer newly appointed to
represent a client on death row must clear her own schedule
in order to devote maximum effort to the new case. This is
often difficult. Good lawyers are by definition busy lawyers.
They may need considerable time to dispose of other responsibilities for which they have a professional duty of zealous
advocacy. The attorney must also locate, visit, and interview
92. The OLP Report cites former Attorney General Smith for the view that death
row prisoners deliberately delay federal petitions until execution is imminent.
REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 951; accord Bell v. Lynaugh, 858
F.2d 978, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1988) (Jones, J., concurring). The more likely explanation
for feverish litigation on the eve of executions is that it is then, and often only then,
that prisoners obtain counsel. Legal talent for prisoners sentenced to death is spread
thin in the United States. See Hearings on H.R. 4737, supra note 2 (statement of
former Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) ("I agree with those who say that the fairness of
capital litigation would be enhanced by the provision of better counsel at the early
stages of capital litigation, especially at trial ....
Our Committee tried to assess the
situation realistically, and to give the States an incentive to provide counsel in one
area where it is not required at all-at the postconviction stage.") Specialists
typically channel their efforts through a sort of triage, which gives highest priority
to clients in immediate danger. The federal government has only recently begun
providing all indigent death row prisoners with counsel in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181,
4393-94 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(g)(4) (1988)).
93. In complex civil litigation (antitrust litigation, for example), teams of
sophisticated attorneys spend a great deal of time preparing their cases before
putting anything before a court. Death penalty litigation demands and deserves
similar treatment. Cf. Mercer v. Armontrout, 864 F.2d 1429, 1433 (8th Cir. 1988)
(estimating that on average a competent lawyer would have to devote a quarter of her
annual billable hours to a single postconviction attack on a death sentence).
94. See generally Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299 (1983); Mello, FacingDeath Alone: The
Post-ConvictionAttorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 513 (1988).
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the prisoner-spending the time and effort necessary both
to win the client's confidence and to obtain information
essential to the case. Many death row prisoners are poorly
educated and inarticulate;9 5 some are mentally retarded.9 6
It is no small matter, then, to deal with the client both sympathetically and effectively. Visits to death row typically
mean extensive travel, compliance with a host of prison
rules and regulations, and other inefficiencies. Days and
weeks may be spent simply arranging access to the prisoner.
Time is also required to obtain the record of the case. In
some cases, an attorney appointed for the postconviction
stages may be able to obtain the trial and appellate records in
a few weeks. In a great many instances, however, the
attorney needs much more time to obtain a full complement of
materials, including transcripts of testimony and similarly
lengthy documents. To fill in particulars, counsel must also
contact police officers, prosecutors, and other attorneys who
represented the prisoner in the past. In light of what counsel
learns in these ways, he must investigate the factual history
of the case-tracing down the full range of matters going both
to constitutional claims touching the prisoner's criminal
conviction and to the legitimacy of the death sentence.9
Witnesses must be found, interviewed, and prepared for court
appearances. In many cases, professional investigators must
be employed and superintended.
Not only the factual record, but the relevant law in the case
must be thoroughly researched. The attorney must become
familiar with local criminal law, criminal procedural rules,
and, most importantly, the extraordinary intricacies of death
penalty jurisprudence.
The complexities of state postconviction practice and federal habeas corpus must also be
conquered. As anyone familiar with these matters will attest,
a death penalty case makes enormous demands upon the
lawyer assigned to represent the prisoner, forcing her into
what may be entirely new and difficult legal materials.
Finally, the lawyer must marshal the results of these investi-

95. Cf BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 83, at 83 (table 319) (indicating that
more than 50% of state prison inmates have fewer than 12 years of education).
96. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2938-39 (1989) (overturning the
death sentence of a mentally retarded prisoner).
97. Not the least of these investigations is the exploration of the prisoner's
psychiatric record. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the
eighth amendment prohibits the execution of an insane prisoner).
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gations and prepare legal documents for presentation to the
federal courts-a petition, a legal memorandum, and any other
supporting documents that may be appropriate.9" In the end,
then, we should be pleasantly surprised that habeas corpus litigation in death penalty cases is launched as early as it is.
Nor do the data support the proposition that habeas petitions are routinely delayed. The OLP Report presumes to
speak to the current situation, but relies solely on Paul
Robinson's study, published in 1979. 9 Robinson reported
that "[o]n the average" the prisoners under examination filed
habeas actions in federal court "just over two years" after
conviction and that the "most common interval from conviction
to filing" was a year and a half.10 0 The OLP Report fails to
mention these average figures and prefers, instead, a subsequent analysis of Robinson's raw data by students at RutgersCamden, which notes that forty percent of the petitions
studied were filed more than five years after conviction and
that a third were filed more than ten years later.' 01 From
this, the OLP Report derives a "finding" that "there are
frequently enormous delays between the conclusion of the
normal adjudicatory process in the state courts and the filing
of a habeas corpus petition." 2 Neither Professor Robinson
nor his students at Rutgers made such a claim. Indeed, the
Rutgers students came to the conclusion that "lengthy delay
. . . rarely occurs."' 3 The OLP Report alone insists otherwise, notwithstanding that during the period between conviction and the filing of a federal petition, the typical prisoner
in the Robinson study was called upon to exhaust state remedies10 4 as well as prepare for federal litigation in the manner

98. For an overview of the necessary qualifications and responsibilities of attorneys
appointed to death penalty cases, see AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 3-28 (1990).

99. REPORT NO. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 947 n.105 (citing P. ROBINSON,
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

OF FEDERAL HABEAS

CORPUS REVIEW

OF STATE COURT

JUDGMENTS (Federal Justice Research Program 1979)).
100. P. ROBINSON, supra note 99, at 9.
101. REPORT NO. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 950 & n.114 (citing Allen,
Schachtman & Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and its Reform: An Empirical
Analysis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 703-04 (1982)).
102. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 949-50.
103. Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, supra note 101, at 703. The OLP Report labels
this conclusion "idiosyncratic." REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 950
n. 114.
104. See REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 948.
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The OLP Report purports to describe "enormous delays" not
in the cases Robinson studied a decade ago, but in cases
litigated today.'0° Yet much has changed over the past
decade. Acting on a proposal offered by the Judicial Conference in 1976, the Congress promulgated special rules for
habeas corpus cases, which became effective on February 1,
1977.107 Rule 9(a) of the Habeas Corpus Rules provides:
A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state
of which the respondent is an officer has been prejudiced
in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing
unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of
which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of
reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial
to the state occurred. 08
Rule 9(a) is not a rigid statute of limitations, but incorporates the doctrine of laches for habeas corpus cases. The rule
encourages prisoners to file as soon as they can and authorizes
the federal courts to dismiss tardy claims when the prisoner
might have applied earlier and the delay actually results in
prejudice to the state. This is reasonable in the circumstances
of federal habeas corpus, providing an incentive to prisoners
while allowing necessary flexibility. The courts, in turn, have

105. The OLP Report acknowledges that the exhaustion of state appellate and
collateral remedies may require "up to a few years," but contends that the average
time demanded for exhaustion (2.8 years in the Robinson study) cannot account for
the further delays noted in some instances. Id. at 950 n.114. Robinson's figures for
the average time between conviction and federal filing and the average time for
exhaustion appear to conflict because a large proportion of the prisoners in the study
(37.1%) failed to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine. P. ROBINSON, supra note 99, at 13.
The. OLP Report simply compares the time taken for habeas filings with the time
allowed in ordinary criminal cases for notices of appeal and motions for new trial.
REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 950. Those are incommensurate
analogies. Habeas corpus is not necessarily, or even ordinarily, anything like
appellate review of state court judgments. But see Friedman, supra note 64
(elaborating an appellate model for federal habeas but scarcely proposing that
petitions could be filed within a period suited to ordinary appellate review). The
better reference would be to statutes of limitation for constitutional tort litigation-allowing a minimum of two years in most states. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 338 (West 1982) (three years); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (1984) (two years).
106. See REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 949-51.
107. Rules on Habeas Corpus, Pub. L. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334 (1976) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rules 1-11 (1988)).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9(a) (1988).
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developed an effective framework for evaluating claims of undue
delay and prejudice to the state-providing adequate protection
against prisoners who drag their feet needlessly. °9
Almost all the cases Professor Robinson examined were filed
before Rule 9(a) became effective. There is no question about
this; Robinson was explicit that he and his staff chose petitions filed in several districts over a two-year period, fiscal
years 1976-77 (between July 1, 1975 and June 30, 1977).11 °
Accordingly, Rule 9(a) was operable only for the last five of the
twenty-four months covered by the project. The data gathered
in the Robinson study are thus wholly inadequate for a
legitimate assessment of current arrangements-after Rule
9(a) has been in place for a dozen years. The OLP is silent on
this point. More recent data indicate that tardy habeas corpus
petitions present no serious continuing problem-perhaps
because of Rule 9(a), perhaps for other reasons. A study
undertaken by the Institute of Judicial Administration at New
York University shows that in 77% of the habeas corpus
actions filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York during the calendar years
1979-8 1, the petitioners had been convicted in those very years
or within the previous three-year period, 1976-78.11'
The OLP's contention that most habeas petitions are
frivolous and thus are unworthy of judicial attention".2 is
similarly short on hard support. The success rate among

109. See L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 114 (Supp. 1990) (collecting
illustrative cases).
110. P. ROBINSON, supra note 99, at 44 & app. 1 at 4. Professor Robinson also
studied cases pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
during the same period. Id. at 5 n.6. The petitions in those cases had, of course,
been filed at the district level prior to the effective date of Rule 9(a).
111. The study was conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Judicial
Administration with financial support from the State Justice Institute (SJI). The
views expressed are not to be ascribed to SJI. Tina Rubenstein was project director;
Richard Faust was data analyst; I served as principal investigator. The statistics
reported in the text are included in the project's preliminary report: R. Faust, T.
Rubenstein & L. Yackle, The Great Writ in Action: Empirical Light on the Federal
Habeas Corpus Debate 78 (draft ed. Oct. 30, 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (copy
on file with the author) [hereinafter THE GREAT WRIT IN ACTION]. Returns regarding
the time between the conclusion of state court proceedings and the filing of habeas
corpus petitions were incomplete, permitting no extrapolations in which we could
have confidence. However, inasmuch as the prisoners in this study were required to
exhaust state remedies after state court conviction, it is fair to say on the basis of
data touching conviction dates alone that habeas petitioners in the Southern District
of New York did not sit on their rights.
112. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 951.
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habeas corpus petitioners does appear low in the abstract.
Professor Robinson reported that only 3.2% of the petitions he
and his staff examined resulted in "any relief."113 There is
evidence, moreover, that a few ostensibly sympathetic district
judges may have accounted for more than their proportionate
1 4
share of successful habeas actions in the Robinson study.
Prisoners were awarded relief in 4% of the 1979-81 cases
examined by the Institute of Judicial Administration." '
In the circumstances, however, one would scarcely expect
anything else. By hypothesis, given the exhaustion doctrine,
habeas corpus applicants have previously presented their
federal claims to the state courts. If the state courts are doing
a respectable job of enforcing the Constitution, and certainly
if their reliability in this respect equals that of the federal
courts as the OLP Report maintains," 6 one would anticipate
that prisoners turned away without relief in the state courts
may also suffer dismissal in federal habeas. Indeed, if the
success rate were substantially higher than it is, the case for
federal habeas corpus as a corrective mechanism for state
court error would be overwhelming. As it is, the modest
numbers of successful habeas corpus petitioners shed little
light on the need for federal collateral review. The OLP insists that the low success rate indicates that the state courts
are fully effective.' 7 Yet one can respond with equal force
that if the state courts are acting responsibly, it is because
they know that the federal habeas corpus courts are available
to consider federal claims later."18 To test the contribution
made by federal habeas corpus, we would have to observe the
state courts operating without the federal district courts

113. P. ROBINSON, supra note 99, at 4(c).
114. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 948 & n.110 (noting that
three judges were involved in 29.9% of the cases in which relief was awarded and
that twelve judges accounted for over two-thirds of those cases).
115. THE GREAT WRIT IN ACTION, supra note 111, at 81. Death row petitioners
break the pattern with a success rate estimated at between one-third and one-half
of all cases. Cf Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, J. dissenting)
(reporting that the federal courts of appeals granted relief to "approximately 70%" of
death row prisoners whose appeals from denials of habeas corpus relief were
reviewed on the merits between 1976 and mid-1983) (citing Brief for NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at le-6e).
116. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 957-59.
117. See id. at 948.
118. Judge Lay has been making this point for years. E.g., Lay, The Constitution,
the Supreme Court, and Mr. Meese: Habeas Corpus and the Doctrine of Original
Intent, 1986 DET. C.L. REV. 983, 990.
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waiting in the wings. Of course, we have already run that
experiment in this country. The results were not pretty.119
The OLP Report's complaints that the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction draws a flood of tardy, frivolous claims into the
federal forum do not withstand scrutiny. Viewed realistically,
and in light of reasonable inferences from thelittle solid data
available, the federal courts' authority to entertain habeas
petitions from state prisoners makes only modest claims on
federal judicial resources, tolerates no dilatory tactics, and
results in the award of relief to a predictably small number of
petitioners. Most important, habeas corpus makes possible
the federal elaboration of federal claims that otherwise might
be neglected.

IV. RECENT CASES

The OLP Report implies that recent Supreme Court decisions endorse fragmentary, if not sweeping, restrictions on
is1
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. 12' This claim 12
point,
the
make
OLP
the
by
noted
decisions
The
justified.
and there are others. 2 2 Indeed, the rare occasions on which
the Court has seemingly enlarged the availability of the writ
stand out as surprising exceptions to the general trend in the
opposite direction. 123 Petitioners before the Court should

119. Cf., e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952).
120. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 952-53.
121. Id. at 952-53. The Report lists McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)
(limiting the claims that prisoners who pleaded guilty in state proceedings can raise
in federal court) and Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (same); Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (tightening the rules regarding procedural default in
state court); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (largely excluding fourth
amendment exclusionary rule claims from federal habeas corpus); and Sumner v.
Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (requiring greater deference to state court fact finding).
122. E.g., Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377 (1984) (apparently approving the
dismissal of a successive petition because of the prisoner's failure to explain why new
claims had not been offered earlier); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)
(approving expedited habeas adjudication in death penalty cases); Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509 (1982) (tightening the exhaustion doctrine as a prerequisite to federal
habeas). Of course, the Teague line of cases might be cited here, but I promised not
to talk about that. See supra note 67.
123. I count as (arguable) exceptions Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989)
(applying to collateral proceedings in habeas corpus the "plain statement" rule
previously established for direct review and making it clear that procedural
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count themselves lucky if the Justices bypass the opportunity
their cases may present to close the federal courts' doors ever
tighter against habeas petitions.'2 4 Moreover, the rhetoric
125
of recent majority opinions has been consistently critical.
Yet the Court's decisions reflect no clearly articulated
acceptance of the OLP Report's position that procedural
safeguards in criminal justice serve only the search for
historical truth and that federal habeas corpus is therefore
redundant, irrelevant, and (accordingly) dispensable. There is,
to be sure, a good deal of talk in the cases about accuracy in
the criminal process. 26 Moreover, the factual guilt or innocence of the defendant in the dock bulks large in the Court's
treatment of procedural safeguards-both constitutional rights
and mechanisms for the protection of those rights like federal
habeas corpus. 27 In this vein, the Court tends, in turn, to
merge the reliability of the outcome in criminal cases with the
normative matter of procedural fairness. Still, the Court often
approves procedures that plainly generate results that are
inaccurate by any sensible definition of the term. 2 ' And,
most important with respect to habeas corpus, the Court
routinely invokes procedural rules that evade the treatment of
claims that may bear on guilt.'2 9 In this section, I want first
to propose an account of procedural safeguards that better fits
the cases, and then to explain why simplistic appeals to
historical truth or factual guilt fail to capture what the

defaults that would not cut off direct review in the Supreme Court will not preclude
federal habeas corpus either) and Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (arguably
loosening the exhaustion doctrine with respect to factual allegations-albeit in
narrow circumstances).
124. Only a few recent cases have affirmed the breadth of the writ. See, e.g.,
Maleng v. Cook, 109 S. Ct. 1923 (1989) (noting that a petitioner may attack a
sentence under which he is currently in custody on the ground that it was enhanced
because of an earlier conviction, the sentence for which has been served);
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (permitting a prisoner to claim
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to a lawyer's failure to raise a fourth
amendment exclusionary rule objection); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,684
(1984) (reaffirming that despite the exhaustion doctrine, a petitioner's failure to
exhaust all state remedies does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction of
habeas claims); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (declining to extend Stone v.
Powell to a case in which the prisoner alleged race discrimination in the selection of
a grand jury foreperson).
125. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (marshalling the "costs" of
postconviction habeas corpus).
126. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1989).
127. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986).
128. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); see also infra note 134.
129. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Alford, 400 U.S. 25.
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Justices are about.
Upon examination, the Supreme Court's decisions of late
appear to regard the criminal process not as a means of
achieving accuracy in criminal judgments, but rather as a
rough mechanism for disposing of society's disputes with a
class of citizens who threaten stability-whatever the objective
"truth" of the charges against them. By this account, federal
procedural safeguards neither advance the pursuit of historical/factual truth nor serve other values at risk in criminal
prosecutions. Rather, the Bill of Rights is an arsenal of
weapons available to the defense in criminal cases, weapons
that may be used or not at the discretion of counsel in the
course of adversarial relations with the prosecution. Consistent with this "dispositional" account, the courts can and often
do settle criminal cases without determining historical truth
with any genuine confidence, without respecting procedural
rights calculated to produce accurate decisions, and, certainly,
without insisting upon respect for procedural safeguards as
political statements of individual liberty. The dispositional
account of criminal justice is inadequate as a coherent model
against which to appraise existing law and practice or by
which to judge the character and consistency of argument. It
is instead a collage of value-laden, intensely ideological
notions about the way the world works or ought to work.
This, at any rate, is the picture that emerges from a close
reading of the Court's opinions-as opposed to the OLP's
image of a truth-seeking, guilt-focused body of case law.
The OLP looks to the plea negotiation cases decided in the
early 1970s.3 for evidence of the Court's concern for historical truth and factual guilt or innocence.'1 1 Thus, the Report
argues that constitutional claims do not (in the main) survive
pleas of guilty because once factual guilt has been established
by plea, procedural safeguards meant to ensure accurate
decision making at trial are no longer pertinent.1 3 2 If the

130. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); see also Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S, 790 (1970).
131. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 952.
132. Id. The notorious footnote in Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), does,
indeed, seem to say as much:
[A] counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that,
where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual
guilt from the case. . . . A guilty plea . . . simply renders irrelevant those
constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment
of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt
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plea cases are examined carefully, however, they plainly stand
for something quite different. They are excellent illustrations
of an overriding concern for early (and thus cheap) dispositions
in criminal cases, dispositions that often fail to match a
defendant's culpability with an appropriate conviction.
Fairly read, the plea bargain cases contemplate that at the
outset of criminal proceedings, defendants are presented with
an all-important choice. Defendants can put the state to its
proof, in which case they will have the benefit of all the
procedural safeguards established by the Constitution and, in
addition, the prospect of appellate and collateral review of any
asserted errors in the proceedings. Alternatively, defendants
may choose self-conviction by way of a plea of guilty, in which
case they will have the benefits of any plea bargain that can
be worked with the prosecution, but will surrender the
procedural safeguards that would have attended a trial and
the availability of further review of any alleged failure to
respect those constitutional rights. Defendants who plead
guilty are left, accordingly, with only the claims that can be
raised against the voluntariness of their pleas-including
attacks on the competency of defense counsel.
Within this scheme, the legislature's specification of criminal
offenses and attendant punishments is rarely consulted.
Prosecutors have little time and resources to devote to
individual cases and are thus prepared to accept inaccuracy
(the conviction of defendants for crimes different from the
offenses their behavior warrants) in exchange for the convenience of conviction by plea. Defendants, for their part, are
willing to forego procedural rights in exchange for the benefits
of negotiation, typically reduced punishment. 3 ' Defendants

is validly established.
Id. at 62 n.2.
This language, it must be said, has caused no end of difficulty in the reviews.
Both Saltzburg and Westen contend that the footnote contains an error: the Court
must have meant to say "consistent" rather than "inconsistent." Saltzburg, Pleas of
Guilty and the Loss of ConstitutionalRights: The Current Price of Pleading Guilty,
76 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1278 n.69 (1978); Westen, Away from Waiver:A Rationalefor
the Forfeiture of ConstitutionalRights in CriminalProcedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214,
1223 n.21 (1977). I once agreed, see L. YACKLE, supra note 73, at 406 n.81 (1981), but
on rereading I am no longer so sure. The double negative is hard to decipher. In the
end, however, I understand the Court to be explaining here that procedural
safeguards having as their function the enhancement of accurate fact finding are no
longer needed once a criminal defendant has freely chosen to convict herself by plea.
133. In some instances, it may be fair to say that defendants waive procedural
rights that would otherwise be theirs. E.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
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are convicted, to be sure, but they are not (necessarily) convicted of the offenses of which they are guilty-the offenses to
which a serious estimate of historical truth and a genuine
ascertainment of culpability would lead. Rather, they are
convicted of offenses on which the two sides converge through
hard bargaining. 134 The parties reach agreement by contract, against the background of law provided by prosecutors'
ability to press more serious charges or for more severe
penalties and defendants' entitlement to put the state to its
proof. Moreover, even after matters have been settled in this
way, convicts may upset the agreement on grounds unrelated
to factual guilt. 135
In sum, the criminal justice system
simply disposes of criminal charges apart from any reliable
determination of historical truth and even with an occasional
nod in the direction of values entirely distinct from factual
guilt.
The Court's practical elimination of fourth amendment
exclusionary rule claims from federal habeas corpus provides
similarly superficial evidence that the Justices regard criminal
process as a search for truth and factual guilt. There is, to be
sure, much rhetoric in this direction in Stone v. Powell,3 6

(explaining that a guilty plea amounts to a waiver of the right to trial by jury).
Routinely, however, it is more accurate merely to say that defendants forego claims
they might otherwise assert. For whether they are aware of such claims or not
(knowledge being essential to waiver), defendants surrender them when they
voluntarily and intelligently choose the course of plea negotiation. Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973).
134. The obvious illustration is North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), in
which the Court approved the acceptance of a guilty plea notwithstanding the
defendant's continued claim of innocence. In Alford, of course, there was strong
evidence of guilt, and that evidence was spread on the record to establish a factual
predicate for the plea. Id. at 37-38. It is arguable, accordingly, that the Court only
recognized that defendants might be content to confess guilt even as they insist upon
innocence for some extraneous purpose (anticipated civil actions against them in the
future, for example) and that circumstances of that kind should not make it
impossible to determine guilt by plea. For my part, the lesson to be taken from
Alford, however, is that criminal cases can and should be settled as quickly and
inexpensively as possible and that stubborn arguments over historical truth and
factual guilt or innocence should not get in the way.
135. This is undoubtedly true, although the pool of claims that defeat a plea settlement is neither deep nor clear. See, e.g., Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975)
(allowing a prisoner to raise a double jeopardy claim despite his plea of guilty);
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974) (treating a due process claim in the same
way on the ground that it went to the very authority of the state to hale the
defendant into court to answer charges).
136. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (foreclosing fourth amendment exclusionary claims
in federal habeas if the state courts provide an opportunity for "full and fair"
adjudication).
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and the opinion in that case surely did appear to be concerned
primarily with whether innocent defendants might be convicted.'3 7 Yet the Court tied that concern to the forum allocation question in Stone-whether the federal courts should
enforce the exclusionary rule as readily as the state
courts. 3 8 In dissent, Justice Brennan charged the Court
with limiting habeas corpus to "guilt-related" claims. 139 The
majority, however, stopped well short of that and, indeed,
preserved the federal courts' authority to treat even fourth
amendment claims in cases in which the state courts fail to
accord prisoners an opportunity for full and fair adjudication. 4 °
Later cases have rejected bald arguments that
habeas should be closed to claims insufficiently related to
factual guilt.''
In Kimmelman v. Morrisson,112 moreover, Justice Brennan
neatly cabined Stone as yet another (restrictive) decision
limiting the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to instances
in which the deterrent impact of a refusal to admit evidence
promises to be significant.
The general thrust of the
Kimmelman decision is inconsistent with the notion that this
Court sees the criminal process as a search for truth.
Kimmelman rejects the truth-finding argument out of hand,
confirms that procedural safeguards are available to the guilty
as well as the innocent, and spotlights the role of defense

137. Id. at 491 n.31.
138. "Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure that no
innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious
intrusions on values important to our system of government." Id. In writing for the
full Court in Stone, Justice Powell was far more circumspect with respect to the guiltdetermination function of criminal justice than he might have been if writing for
himself. His previous separate opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring), was far more strident, insisting that exclusionary
rule claims should not be heard in habeas because they "rarely bear on innocence."
Id.
139. Stone, 428 U.S. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 494 n.37.
141. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (refusing to extend Stone to
race discrimination claims); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (declining to
extend Stone to cases in which the petitioner alleges that guilt was not proved beyond
a reasonable doubt). Justice Powell himself showed restraint in a sixth amendment
exclusionary rule case. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell,
J., concurring). But see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (contending that a "strong case" could be made for extending Stone to
grand jury discrimination claims). The threadbare contention that Miranda claims
should be Stoned has not won majority support. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct.
2875, 2281-85 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
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counsel within a system that depends upon adversarial conflict
for the resolution of cases. 4 3 I scarcely mean to commend
the Court's work in Stone or even Kimmelman, which repeats
much of Stone's critique of the exclusionary rule even as it
pushes other rhetoric into the background. 4 4 Nor, certainly,
do I ignore the plain fact that everything depends these days
upon the names of the Justices sitting on a case. It does seem
fair to say, however, that Stone and its progeny resist the
OLP's explanations for criminal process and, by contrast, fit
the dispositional account rather well.
Finally, 145 there is the vexing question of the effect the
federal courts should give to petitioners' procedural defaults
in state court. To situate the Court's recent work in this
sphere next to the OLP's view of criminal process, it is
necessary to review the problems presented by procedural default, problems that are pervasive in the American judicial
system generally. To begin, it seems reasonable to propose
that legal claims should be addressed at the time and in the
manner best suited for efficient adjudication and that procedural rules calling for seasonable consideration are therefore
appropriate. If, for example, the defendant in a criminal
prosecution raises any claims he may have to the introduction
of evidence at the time the evidence is offered, the trial court
can take testimony while memories are relatively fresh and
perhaps can deal with the matter before the defendant is
compromised. The early identification of claims thus fosters
efficient decision making with respect to the claims themselves
and protects the integrity of the guilt-determination process at
the same time.
There is no costless means of ensuring that claims are raised
and treated in a timely manner. As a first cut at the problem,
one might propose to do nothing and thus simply to hope that
defendants raise claims early. In many, perhaps most instances, defendants have powerful incentives to cooperate.
The immediate objective is to succeed, or at least to avoid

143. Id. at 379-80.
144. Id. at 375.
145. I lay aside the OLP's enthusiastic citations to the Court's cases on fact finding
in federal habeas corpus. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 953
(citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)). Whether the federal courts should
routinely defer to fact finding in state court has nothing to do with the supposed
"truth-seeking" function of procedural safeguards and belongs, instead, to the
distribution of labor between the state and federal courts. Cf supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
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heavy losses, at the trial level. Objections to the proceedings,
if sustained, typically offer advantages to the defense on that
score. Accordingly, rational litigants usually can be expected
to press any claims of which they are aware at a time when
those claims offer the most promise of protecting against
conviction-when, for example, the trial judge may be able to
avoid or cure potential error before a case goes to the jury.
The trouble with the laissez faire approach is plain enough.
In all too many instances, incentives inherent in the criminal
process will not generate timely claims. The principal reason
is the sad state of the criminal defense bar in the United
States. Underpaid, overworked, and ill-prepared lawyers offer
services that fail even minimal professional standards.1 4 6
Thus, claims will not be raised seasonably-because of ignorance, oversight, neglect, insufficient time and resources, or
incompetence. Typically, neither the lawyers who represent
criminal defendants nor defendants themselves function as
rational, interest-maximizing actors who can and will respond
In the
reasonably to incentives for timely litigation.14 7
comparatively rare cases in which incentives to raise claims
can work, moreover, there may be counterweight incentives
that tug in the other direction. Lawyers are duty bound to
withhold claims they deem to be frivolous,"' and some
known contentions will not be presented for that reason-whether or not counsel's judgment is sound. Even within
the realm of plausible claims, capable attorneys rank contentions for strategic purposes. It is rarely prudent to offer courts
a laundry list of claims, mixing weak contentions with strong.
Good lawyers know that better claims tend to suffer from the
company they keep and therefore may deliberately withhold
weak claims in an attempt to focus attention in a more
promising direction. In the end, then, the incentive structure
on which we might pin our hopes for timely litigation either
breaks down in the face of reality or falters in the rare cases
in which it might actually influence counsel behavior.
In this vein, it is necessary to mention one other matter-the persistent argument that defense counsel may
"sandbag" the state courts. I say it is necessary to discuss

146. See generally McConville & Mirsky, CriminalDefense of the Poor in New York
City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581 (1986).
147. See generally Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads,
New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986).
148. Cf. FED. R. Cv. P. 11.
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sandbagging not because there is any substance to the
argument, but because the picture the argument creates plays
an important role in current habeas corpus doctrine.'4 9 The
sandbagging argument runs this way. In some instances,
defense counsel may be aware of a nonfrivolous claim in time
to raise it but nevertheless may deliberately withhold the
claim in order to "save" it for litigation later. The easiest
illustration is, again, a jury trial in which defense counsel is
aware of an objection to evidence offered by the prosecution.
A timely objection will give the trial judge an opportunity to
pass on the defense claim immediately, avoiding error if the
claim is sustained and building a record for appeal if the claim
is rejected. If counsel anticipates that the client may escape
conviction notwithstanding the admission of the offending
evidence, so the argument goes, she may sit silent. If the
defendant is acquitted, the presence of error will make no
difference. If the defendant is convicted, the error strategically built into the record by procedural default can be raised on
appeal or in collateral proceedings. 5 '
The vision this argument conjures up is wholly unrealistic.
Again, most lawyers representing criminal clients are unaware
of claims that should be raised at trial and are scarcely in a
position to sandbag the state courts deliberately. In cases in
which counsel is aware of claims, the primary incentive
structure should prompt counsel to act immediately in hopes
of excluding evidence and avoiding conviction. If claims are
strong enough to figure in counsel's plans for appeal or
collateral review, they presumably are strong enough to escape
omission for frivolity or weakness. To contend that counsel
may knowingly withhold potentially meritorious objections at
trial is to argue that counsel may reasonably choose an
increased risk of conviction in order to hold out claims on
which to attack an unfavorable judgment later. This is not
the way trial lawyers think. Rather, they mean, first, to avoid
conviction and, second, to build a complete record for appeal
or collateral review should things go awry. It would be
nonsense for defense attorneys to hold potentially meritorious
claims in reserve at trial, when the underlying facts and
attendant arguments can be spread on the record and when

149. See infra text accompanying notes 162-64.
150. Cf. Meltzer, State Court Forfeituresof FederalRights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128,
1196-97 (1986) (offering other illustrations).
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the claims can either prevent the client's conviction or lay the
groundwork for appeal, in order to call them into service
later-when the claims will suffer from inadequate development in the record and, even at that, can be useful only to
attack a conviction already in place.15 1 Only in special
circumstances, when other evidence is so damning that
conviction is inevitable, would competent counsel entertain
such a strategy. 152 And in circumstances of that kind, the
potential gain would be illusory. If claims held in reserve
were successful later and the conviction were upset, the client
would presumably be reconvicted on the basis of the same (untainted) evidence. Indeed, for that very reason, any error
53
found after conviction might well be considered harmless.'
In the end, however, and notwithstanding the self-evident
weaknesses in the sandbagging argument, the fact remains
that many claims will not be raised in a timely fashion even
though raising them would serve the client's interests.
Usually because of ignorance, negligence, or worse, and
occasionally because of reasonable tactical choices by
knowledgeable counsel, claims will not be presented at the
most appropriate time and place and, instead, will be
identified and offered later-on appeal or in collateral
proceedings. At that point, of course, the practical problems
are exacerbated. Not only has the opportunity for litigation at
trial now been lost, but in most cases it will be necessary to
undertake fact-finding proceedings in order to develop the
evidence. In some instances, it will be appropriate to remand
to the trial court for further work. If claims are found to be

151. See Resnik, supra note 77, at 896-97 (noting that the sandbagging argument
posits a 'fantastically risk-prone pool of defendants and attorneys"); accord Berger,
supra note 147, at 26 n.98; Meltzer, supra note 150, at 1199.
152. The truth is, many trial lawyers do not expect to represent clients beyond
trial and, thus, hardly wish to compromise their own work for the benefit of other
advocates in a different time and place. See Committee on Civil Rights, Pending
Legislation to Amend the Federal Habeas Corpus Statutes, 35 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y.
124, 135 (1980) (noting that court-appointed trial counsel 'rarely stay on" to
represent clients in federal habeas corpus proceedings).
153. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (turning the harmlessness
of error on the weight of other evidence). Of course, it is possible that counsel's
strategy could embrace these possibilities. If conviction is inevitable on the basis of
other evidence, if a currently withheld claim could be constructed from a barren
record, if the harmless error doctrine could be avoided, and if retrial would be
troublesome or particularly expensive for the prosecution-then counsel might be in
a position to negotiate a better settlement for the client by plea. Cases in which such
scheming is plausible must be extremely rare and scarcely the stuff from which
routine doctrine is or should be fashioned.
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meritorious and nonharmless, convictions must be set aside.
And proceedings against the accused must begin anew. Small
wonder that the states resist a scheme that values legal claims
so highly that monumental state interests must be sacrificed
in order to treat them. State officials can be expected to resist
any arrangement that invites tardy claims and all the practical problems that attend them. Late claims, if heard, threaten
the state's fundamental ability to obtain and preserve criminal
convictions.
Unfortunately, concerns for adjudicative efficiency in
criminal cases have generated a system that tips the balance
dramatically in the other direction-a system that routinely
surrenders potentially meritorious claims to procedural
convenience. The engine that drives this machine is the
familiar contemporaneous objection rule, which not only
encourages but requires defendants to raise objections to their
treatment "contemporaneously" and which forecloses any
15 4
future opportunity to present claims not raised in season.
By this means, the states avoid treating claims that would demand that the trial record be reopened. On direct review by
way of certiorari, moreover, the Supreme Court is without
jurisdiction to overturn state judgments resting on adequate
and independent state procedural grounds.' 5 5 Thus, defendants who commit procedural default with respect to
potentially meritorious federal constitutional claims can be
convicted and punished in violation of the Bill of Rights and
nevertheless be turned away both by the state appellate
courts and by the Supreme Court itself. 56 The rigidity of
the resulting system is tempered on occasion. Most states
permit their appellate courts to overlook default when the
merits must be reached to correct "plain error" or to avoid a
"miscarriage of justice."'5 7 And the Supreme Court may slice
through state procedural grounds it finds to be inadequate or
insufficiently independent to foreclose consideration of
underlying federal claims."'
Still, procedural efficiency

154. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (1).
155. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S.
207 (1935).
156. See generally Brilmayer, State ForfeitureRules and Federal Review of State
Criminal Convictions, 49 U. Ci. L. REV. 741 (1982).
157. See, e.g., Marrone v. State, 653 P.2d 672, 675-76 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982);
People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 555, 539 N.E.2d 1196, 1202 (1989); Commonwealth
v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 513, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (1988).
158. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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usually prevails in head-to-head competition with federal
rights-within the framework of direct review.
If petitioners later seek relief from state custody by way of
federal habeas corpus, the conceptual arrangements are quite
different. Habeas corpus in the lower federal courts is not an
appellate mechanism for testing state court judgments for
error.159 Habeas petitions initiate entirely new and independent legal actions, civil in nature, that more closely resemble
civil rights lawsuits for damages or injunctive relief than
further stages of criminal prosecutions begun in state
court.6 ° Indeed, habeas litigation awaits the conclusion of
state proceedings only because values associated with federalism recommend placing responsibility for the criminal law
with the states; because the federal claims cognizable in
habeas typically arise out of local criminal investigations,
trials, and appeals; and because earlier federal involvement
might frustrate orderly state processes. Properly understood,
federal habeas corpus has no concern for state procedural
interests after the state courts have finished with petitioners
and thus might reasonably ignore procedural default in state
court, irrespective of the effect default may have been given in
the state courts themselves or in the Supreme Court on direct
review.
The theoretical status of the federal courts' habeas corpus
jurisdiction to one side, the practical significance of habeas as
a means of testing criminal judgments collaterally suggests,
naturally enough, that here, too, some account should be taken
of the procedural default problem. The same range of concerns and options again presents itself: the federal courts must
strike some balance between federal rights and procedural efficiency. In the 1960s, the Warren Court gave state procedural
interests priority within the context of direct review, but
fashioned a different rule for habeas corpus-a different rule
reflecting its own, different compromises between competing
values. Initially, the state courts were allowed to cut off
claims because of default, and on direct review the Court let
state judgments rest on procedural default grounds-subject
to exceptions marked off by the adequate state ground
doctrine.'
In federal habeas corpus, by contrast, the re159. This is where I part company with (well-meaning) revisionists.
E.g.,
Friedman, supra note 64 (reading the cases to contemplate an appellate model).
160. See Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 265 n.9 (1978).
161. If Justice Brennan meant to suggest otherwise in Henry v. Mississippi, 379
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verse was true. Despite default in state court, claims were
routinely reached on the merits-subject to an exception for
petitioners whose default in state court constituted a "deliberate by-passing" of state procedures.' 6 2 This, of course, was
the regime of Fay v. Noia. Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court in Noia insisted that the forfeiture of appellate remedies
was sufficient to protect state procedural interests and that
the availability of federal habeas, despite default, was essential to preserve
some adjudicative opportunity for federal
16 3
claims.
The interesting question regarding the Warren Court's
position in Noia is the Court's reason or reasons for allowing
any exceptions at all to the general habeas corpus rule that
procedural default should not foreclose federal adjudication on
the merits. The conventional explanation for the deliberate
bypass rule is that the rule reflects an attempt to retain the
writ's historical links with equity. Thus the bypass exception
only precluded manipulative petitioners who approached the
federal courts without "clean hands."'6 4 By defining bypass
as waiver, moreover, the Court ensured that few petitioners
would actually be denied the federal forum. That result, in
turn, was wholly consistent with the Court's larger intention
that habeas should generally be open for adjudication on the
merits and should not be frustrated by forfeiture rules
designed to protect state procedural interests.
There is a better explanation. The waiver standard adopted
in Noia may have been grounded in the same value judgment
that explains the acceptance of waivers in other contexts. The
fundamental notion is personal autonomy. Although individuals may have rights, substantive and procedural, at their
disposal, they have no corresponding duty to insist upon those
rights and may, if they wish, decline to assert them. If the
waiver of rights were not respected, the individual's integrity
as a free and responsible citizen would be impugned. The

U.S. 443, 448 (1965), he was unsuccessful. See id. at 457 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
162. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963); see generally Yackle, Book Review, 17
CRIM. L. BULL. 479 (1981). Said another way, the Court instructed the lower federal
courts to disregard state procedural rulings and reach the merits even if relevant
state judgments could stand (constitutionally) on procedural grounds and even if the
Supreme Court itself was barred. To demonstrate deliberate bypass, the state was
required to show that petitioners intentionally relinquished or abandoned a" 'known
right or privilege.'" Noia, 372 U.S. at 439.
163. Noia, 372 U.S. at 398-99, 429-30.
164. See id. at 438-39.
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basis for accepting waivers, then, is deference to individual
choice in a liberal society. At the same time, the public
interest in orderly proceedings regarding rights justifies limits
on the individual's freedom to change positions at will. And
if litigants freely and voluntarily choose to forego claims (or
opportunities to litigate claims), they can be held to those
choices for the protection of state reliance interests. In Noia,
Justice Brennan may have intended to say something unexceptional: litigants cannot change their minds willy-nilly as
judicial processes progress, upsetting those processes on a
whim, and habeas petitioners who behave in that fashion can
be barred from the federal forum, irrespective of the merits of
the claims they wish (belatedly) to present.
A third possibility may be mentioned, but quickly discarded.
It is possible, but most unlikely, that the bypass rule was
meant to encourage compliance with the contemporaneous
objection rule in state court by foreclosing collateral review in
habeas corpus in addition to direct review in state court and
in the Supreme Court. This instrumental explanation has no
serious footing. If lawyers representing criminal defendants
do not respond to powerful affirmative incentives to press
it scarcely
claims in a timely manner, and they don't,'
seems likely that they would respond to additional, negative
incentives provided by further penalties. Carrots usually work
better than sticks. As an instrument for channeling human
behavior, the bypass rule was both underinclusive (failing to
speak at all to cases in which default was unintentional) and
overinclusive (reaching all deliberate choices to withhold
claims-even legitimate decisions to separate weak claims
from strong).16 6 If the bypass rule were meant to influence

165. See supra text accompanying notes 147-50.
166. This last presents a close question. One might plausibly contend that
counsel's legitimate attempts to present a client's strongest claims in the best
possible light should nonetheless have the effect of cutting off claims withheld for
their apparent weakness. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)
(describing a lawyer's efforts to winnow out weak claims on appeal as the hallmark
of professional advocacy); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36, (1986)
(relying on Jones in a procedural default context). But see Jones, 463 U.S. at 775
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (insisting that claims omitted by lawyers on this basis
should not be foreclosed in later habeas corpus proceedings instituted by different
counsel or by the prisonerpro se). Thus, legitimate, tactical defaults could be treated
in the same manner as manipulative attempts to deprive the state courts of an
opportunity to pass on claims in favor of a later federal forum. Such a rule would be
controversial, however. At the very least it would seem to invite lawyers to pile up
objections of dubious substance, depriving clients and courts alike of the value of
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counsel's strategy, it presumably would have been aimed at
tactical decisions to circumvent the state courts while holding
open litigation in the federal forum-i.e., sandbagging. There
is no evidence that Justice Brennan gave that business serious
attention and much
reason to assume he discounted sandbag16 7
ging entirely.
The personal waiver standard in Noia came under attack in
subsequent years, and soon after the Court's membership
changed during the Nixon administration, the bypass rule was
discarded in most instances. 6 ' In its place, the newly constituted Court introduced an entirely different scheme, pursuant to which procedural dismissals have become the rule in
federal habeas corpus, just as they are on direct review-subject to exceptions for cases in which petitioners
demonstrate "cause" for their default and "prejudice" from
constitutional violations that went uncorrected in state court
because of procedural default.'6 9 The leading case is Wainwright v. Sykes, 70 in which then-Justice Rehnquist wrote for
the Court. The OLP Report cites Sykes as yet another illustration of the current Court's resistance to federal habeas corpus
as a general postconviction remedy.' 7 ' Again, there is little
doubt that recent cases do indicate retrenchment. I only want
to contend that although Sykes and other cases in the same
line reflect dissatisfaction with the Warren Court's treatment
of the procedural default problem, they do not necessarily
endorse the OLP's preoccupation with historical truth.
On its face, the Rehnquist opinion in Sykes reviews the
Court's previous treatment of procedural default down to and
since Noia and then embraces a different rule, the cause-andprejudice rule, for future application. 172
There is much

careful advocacy. In this vein, it should be noted that professionals now urge their
colleagues to raise even the most unlikely claims in brief (thus avoiding any later
claim of default), but to focus the reviewing court's attention on more promising
contentions in oral argument. Telephone conversation with George Kendall, Counsel,
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (May 1, 1990). At any rate, I find it difficult to believe
that the Warren Court meant to ignore the subtleties within the realm of deliberate
defaults and simply to punish all such defaults in the same way.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 162-64.
168. It remains an open question whether the bypass rule might still govern cases
in which the default is a failure to seek appellate review. See, e.g., Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490 (1986) (noting but passing over the issue).
169. See generally L. YACKLE, supra note 73, at 297-356.
170. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
171. REPORT No. 7, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 1, at 952.
172. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
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attention to the state interests served by the contemporaneous
objection rule and much concern lest the availability of federal
habeas corpus, despite default, somehow undercut state attempts to maintain orderly procedures for addressing federal
claims.' 3 The most disturbing feature of Sykes is the Court'swillingness to credit the sandbagging argument, at least in
form, as a partial explanation for a forfeiture sanction in
federal, as well as state, court. 1 74 That line of analysis being
fatuous,' 5 one comes away from Sykes with the firm impression that the Court means to be even tougher than its language would indicate. The true explanation for cutting off
claims raised "too late" is the mere fact of default, rather than
any deliberate litigational behavior sought to be discouraged.
The Court frankly prefers to disregard potentially meritorious
constitutional claims if, in order to treat them on the merits,
it would be necessary to reopen the record. When claims are
not raised in season, they are simply sacrificed to the assumed
greater good of adjudicative efficiency.
This regime is not grounded in a search for historical
accuracy. When, in fact, the petitioner in Engle v. Isaac"6
argued that the cause-and-prejudice rule should not apply to
claims touching factual guilt, the Court dismissed the idea out
of hand.'7 7 Claims are foreclosed, whatever bearing they
may have on guilt or innocence, simply in order that state
judgments not be disturbed. In this there is hostility to
postconviction habeas corpus, to be sure, but a general,
overarching hostility reflecting many themes, principal among
them concern for the finality of state judgments, rather than
a focused insistence that the adjudication of criminal cases
begin and end with the ascertainment of factual guilt.
The OLP Report fails to mention one aspect of current
procedural default doctrine that does attach significance to
petitioners' factual guilt. On the whole, the Court has insisted
that the cause-and-prejudice rule, for all its rigidity, will not
generate bad results. The Justices are apparently confident
that "victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 89.
See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
456 U.S. 107 (1982).
Id. at 129.
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the cause-and-prejudice standard." 7 '
Nevertheless, the
79 that mistakes of that
Court allowed in Murray v. Carrier'
order might still occur. Accordingly, in an "extraordinary case,
where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent," the district courts
may reach the merits of a petitioner's claim "even in the
absence of . . . cause." 8 0 Special dispensation from the
Sykes rule for cases in which factual innocence is in doubt
does suggest a focus on guilt determination as a goal of
criminal process. Similar references in other habeas contexts
underscore the point.''
Where the Court intends to take
its new-found interest in petitioners' possible innocence is far
from clear. In Smith v. Murray,8 2 a slim majority expressed
concern only for factual, not legal, innocence and thus refused
to consider a claim that the jury that sentenced a petitioner to
death had heard inadmissible evidence that might have determined the decision to impose capital punishment.'83 That
result scarcely indicates that the door cracked open in Carrier
is likely to swing wide in the days to come. Certainly the full
Court is yet some distance from revising procedural default
doctrine to make factual guilt the "only value" served by the
criminal process.'84
The dominant picture that emerges from these recent cases
on default is, instead, the dispositional account of criminal justice. Listen to Justice O'Connor in the sixth amendment case
Strickland v. Washington:
The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
...

[T]he purpose of the effective assistance guarantee

178. Id. at 135.
179. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
180. Id. at 496.
181. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (indicating that a successive petition may be entertained to serve the" 'ends of justice'" in a case in which
a habeas applicant "supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing
of factual innocence").
182. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
183. Id. at 537-38.
184. Id. at 544 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined on this point by Marshall and
Blackmun, JJ.) (resisting any such sentiments in the majority opinion).
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• .. is not to improve the quality of legal representation,
although that is a goal of considerable importance to the
legal system. The purpose is simply185to ensure that
criminal defendants receive a fair trial.
And in the procedural default case Engle v. Isaac:
We do not suggest that every astute counsel would have
relied upon Winship to assert the unconstitutionality of a
rule saddling criminal defendants with the burden of proving an affirmative defense. Every trial presents a myriad
of possible claims. Counsel might have overlooked or
chosen to omit respondents' due process argument while
pursuing other avenues of defense. We have long recognized, however, that the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It
does not insure that defense counsel will recognize
and
18 6
claim.
constitutional
conceivable
every
raise
The vision suggested by this language is one in which the
criminal process is meant neither to determine historical truth
and factual guilt or innocence on the one hand, nor to safeguard constitutional values on the other, but to establish an
adversarial framework within which professional advocates on
each side can dispose of charges. Within this scheme, anything may be compromised-the search for truth, the ascription of criminal culpability, and, indeed, the vindication of the
Bill of Rights. The picture is not a pleasant one; on reflection
it may be more disquieting even than the OLP's approach to
criminal process. Certainly, the dispositional account depends
on assumptions about defense counsel services that rarely hold
true in American courts. In those assumptions there is not
only hostility to plenary federal adjudication of federal claims;
there is cynicism. My purpose here, however, is neither to
develop fully a positive thesis regarding the Court's recent
work, nor to offer a normative critique. I merely mean to
distinguish the OLP Report's account of criminal procedure
from current law in order to clarify the prescriptive program
the Report offers.

185.
186.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-89 (1984).
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-134 (1982).
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CONCLUSION

I have tried in this space to offer some thoughts on the place
of federal procedural safeguards in criminal process and on the
role of federal habeas corpus as a mechanism for enforcing the
Bill of Rights-not in isolated instances but routinely. My text
has been the Report on federal habeas prepared by the Office
of Legal Policy during the Reagan administration. I have criticized the Report for overvaluing the pursuit of historical truth
and the determination of factual guilt in this context; for
providing a misleading description of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction, past and present; and for linking its assault on
the writ to Supreme Court precedents that cannot be fully
explained by reference to the Report's perspective on the
criminal justice system.

